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Abstract
A three-stage market-game mechanism is devised that is simple (actions are
quantities and outcomes are determined by arithmetic operations that do not de-
pend on details of the economy) and achieves efficiency in a two-divisible-good,
pure-exchange setting with potential information-aggregation. After an entry stage,
agents make offers which are provisional for all but a small, randomly selected group.
Then, those offers are announced, and everyone else makes new offers with payoffs
determined by a Shapley-Shubik market game. For a finite and large number of
players, there exists an almost ex post efficient equilibrium. Conditions for unique-
ness are also provided. (98 words)
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1 Introduction
There is a large literature–some of it theoretical (see below) and some of it experimental
(see Axelrod et al. [1])—that deals with settings in which there is dispersed and private
information that is valuable in the sense that better outcomes could be achieved if the
private information is revealed. In such settings, the problem is to induce people to
reveal what they know. This paper deals with a pure-exchange setting in which the
challenge is to achieve ex post efficient allocations using a mechanism that is simple in two
senses. The first is detail-freeness: the mechanism does not rely on specific information
about the economy such as the functional form of agents’ utilities or the way that private
signals relate to the unobservable state (see Hurwicz et al. [7]). The second is that
the participants’ actions are low-dimensional and that there is a simple algorithm that
∗We are indebted to Jim Jordan for very helpful conversations at the inception of this work. We are
also grateful for comments from two anonymous referees and the associate editor.
†Corresponding author; MEDS, Northwestern, t-hu@kellogg.northwestern.edu
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computes the outcome for each profile of participants’ actions. The mechanism we devise
and analyze is a three-stage market-game (trading-post) mechanism. It is simple in those
two senses and, as we show, achieves almost ex post efficiency when the finite number of
agents is sufficiently large.
Some of the literature has focused solely on efficiency. Gul and Postlewaite [6] and
McLean and Postlewaite [8] construct direct mechanisms that achieve almost ex post
efficiency in environments that include ours as a special case. However, as is widely rec-
ognized, their direct mechanisms are not detail-free. Presumably, that is why McLean
and Postlewaite [8] (pages 2,439 and 2,441) do not regard their mechanism as suitable
for actual use. Some of the literature has focused on both efficiency and simplicity under
particular mechanisms. Reny and Perry [13] and Vives [17] study double-auction mecha-
nisms and show that those mechanisms achieve ex post efficiency in special settings: Reny
and Perry [13] assumes unit demands, while Vives [17] assumes quadratic utilities and
normally distributed signals. However, except in such special cases, double auctions are
not simple in terms of actions or the way the mechanism uses those actions. In order to
achieve ex post efficiency in our setting, a general two-divisible-good setting, actions in a
double auction would have to be general demand functions, which are not simple objects.
Moreover, there is no simple algorithm that computes a market-clearing price in the dou-
ble auction from arbitrary demand functions. Our mechanism, in contrast, has agents
choosing one-dimensional actions and has outcomes produced using simple arithmetical
operations (see, also, the remarks in Dubey et. al. [5], page 108).1
The environment we study is a (static) two-divisible-good, finite number-of-agents,
pure-exchange setting in which there is a role for information aggregation. The information-
preference structure is borrowed from Gul and Postlewaite [6] and is closely to related to
those in Reny and Perry [13] and Vives [17]. There is an unobserved state-of-the-world,
which in our case is drawn from a finite set, and there are private signals, also drawn from
a finite set, that are informative about the state. The realized utility of an agent depends
both on the state and on the private signal received. The state can be interpreted as
a common taste (or quality) shock and the signal as an idiosyncratic taste (or quality)
shock. In the language of auction theory, the model is a mixed common-private value
setting. From a more general point of view, the presence of private signals makes it an
adverse-selection model in the sense that after receiving a private signal, each agent knows
something that others do not know. Finally, the setting has agents with endowments that
are not under the direct control of the mechanism.
At stage-1, before learning their types, agents choose whether or not to participate
when faced with a suitably small entry fee. Then the participating agents learn their
types and enter stage-2. At stage-2, each agent names an offer as in most market-game
mechanisms, but faces an exogenous price chosen by the mechanism. Then, in a random
fashion, the mechanism divides the agents into two groups: a small inactive group and
a large active group. Those in the inactive group participate no further; their stage-2
1Peck [12] also obtains information aggregation and efficiency in a two-stage market game, but one
with a finite set of large agents and a continuum of small agents. Ritzberger [14] studies a market game
with limit orders and obtains competitive outcomes in a setting with “private values,” but shows that his
mechanism fails in settings with general aggregate uncertainty.
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offers are executed at the exogenous price. Next, the histogram of the stage-2 offers of the
active agents is announced. Finally, at stage-3, the active group participate in a market
game in which the price is determined by their stage-3 offers as in the usual two-sided
Cournot or market-game model.2
Participating agents face a tradeoff at stage-2. Contingent on becoming inactive, an
agent’s stage-2 offer determines his final payoff so that it is in the agent’s interest to reveal
his private information. Contingent on becoming active, the stage-2 offer affects his final
payoff only by way of its influence on the actions of other active agents at stage-3. And
that influence depends on how beliefs are formulated, both on and off the equilibrium
path.
We have results about existence of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, about almost ex post
efficiency of the equilibrium, and about uniqueness of the equilibrium. All are related to
the ex post competitive equilibria (CE) of a corresponding limit (continuum-of-agents)
economy—an economy in which the state is known and in which the fraction of agents
with each realization of the private signal is the known probability of receiving that signal
conditional on the state.3 If some mild genericity conditions hold and if the finite number
of agents is sufficiently large, then there exists a fully-revealing equilibrium, one in which
everyone participates and in which stage-2 offers reveal the active agents’ types. Moreover,
for any CE of the ex post limit economy, there is a fully-revealing equilibrium in which
the stage-3 behavior converges almost surely to that CE. A crucial aspect of the argument
is the formulation of beliefs so that the stage-2 tradeoff is resolved entirely in favor of the
payoff contingent on being inactive.
Our formulation of beliefs is simple and plausible: it associates any stage-2 offer,
whether in equilibrium or not, with an agent type and then employs Bayes rule to derive
the updated beliefs over the state-of-the-world. In particular, given our formulation of
beliefs, in order to misrepresent one’s type, the stage-2 offer has to be sufficiently far away
from the offer that would be best contingent on being inactive. Then, because the stage-3
effect of the misrepresentation vanishes as the number of agents gets large, the stage-2
tradeoff is resolved in favor of the payoff contingent on being inactive. The assumption
that there is a finite number of states and types is crucial for our construction.
Our notion of almost ex post efficiency is the same as that in Gul and Postlewaite
[6]. The qualification almost arises from two sources: efficiency gains and the randomness
of realizations of the profile of types. Because our mechanism, although feasible, is not
budget-balanced, we need a notion of efficiency that allows for an arbitrarily small Pareto
2As shown in previous work, one-stage market games do not, in general, aggregate information in
a way that leads to efficiency because agents commit to quantities before the relevant information is
revealed. Palfrey [11] uses a Cournot mechanism and obtains ex post optimality, but, as Vives [16] points
out, only because marginal cost is common and constant so that it does not matter how production is
allocated among the firms in the model. Dubey et al. [5] study a dynamic market game with trades in
multiple periods, and show that information may be aggregated, but only after trades and consumption
at the first-period are observed. As they emphasize, this precludes ex post efficiency.
3From the ex ante perspective, it is standard to label any such CE a rational-expectations CE (see,
for example, Reny and Perry [13]). From that perspective, our results establish a strategic foundation
for rational-expectations CE in a new setting—one with divisible goods, general preferences, a general
information structure, and a finite number of agents.
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improvement. And, we only get a characterization of equilibrium with high probability
because the type-profile is random. We show that the outcome of our fully-revealing
equilibrium achieves the same efficiency result as the direct mechanisms constructed in
Gul and Postlewaite [6] and McLean and Postlewaite [8].
We also have a uniqueness result. For this result, we assume that the ex post limit
economy has monotone competitive demand for each state-of-the-world—which, of course,
implies a unique CE for each state—and we make some mild additional assumptions,
including a restriction on off-equilibrium beliefs that is similar to the “no-signaling-what-
you-don’t-know” restriction in Fudenberg and Tirole [4]. Given these assumptions, we
show that any equilibrium in our mechanism is fully revealing.
Several difficulties have to be overcome in order to produce the above results. First,
because types are distributed i.i.d. conditional on the state, we do not have deterministic
replication of a given profile of types. Therefore, in order to show almost-sure convergence
of stage-3 behavior to any given CE of the limit economy, we use a lower hemi-continuity
argument that treats the type-configuration as one of the parameters. Second, at both
stage-2 and stage-3, our mechanism uses resources. At stage-2, the trades of the (small)
inactive group do not necessarily clear at the exogenous price. At stage-3, in order to
avoid the no-trade equilibrium of the market game and for other reasons, the mechanism
makes small exogenous trades using a formulation borrowed from Dubey and Shubik
[2]. To finance those two uses of resources, we impose an entry fee at stage-1, one that
implies feasibility of the mechanism for any actions and one consistent with existence of
an equilibrium in which everyone participates.
Finally, a few remarks are in order about seeming limitations of our environment and
mechanism. As regards the environment, there are two critical assumptions. One is finite
supports for the state and for types and the other is the two-good assumption. While a
finite number of states may seem more restrictive than the continuum specifications in
Reny and Perry [13] and Vives [17], they make strong distributional assumptions that
we do not need. Also, our two-good model may seem limited relative to some multiple-
good trading-post models. In particular, Forges and Minelli [3] have a general finite
number of goods and use a two-stage mechanism that is somewhat similar to ours: agents
send messages about their private information to the mechanism at their first stage,
and, after seeing others’ messages, all agents engage in a market game at their second
stage. However, in order to avoid the well-known difficulty that the proceeds from sales
at some trading posts cannot be used to make purchases on other posts in a multi-
good static trading-post model, they assume a monetary structure of trading posts and
need strong assumptions about the endowments of money and the preferences for it (see
Forges and Minelli [3], Assumption 2 on page 397 and footnote 11 on the same page).
Such assumptions are not so distant from assuming quasi-linear preferences (transferable
utility) and under quasi-linear preferences, our model and results can easily be adapted
to a general finite number of goods. Moreover, Forges and Minelli [3] use a continuum-of-
agents setting which eliminates all the strategic considerations that are central to what
we do.
Our three-stage mechanism may not be the only simple mechanism that achieves ex
post efficiency. One alternative mechanism, which more closely resembles pari-mutuel
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betting, works as follows. The stage-2 offers of the inactive agents are part of the offers
that determine the “price” at stage-3, and their payoffs are determined in the same way
as those for active agents. However, in such a version, even if agents make stage-2 offers
based on the presumption that they will be inactive, they would want to predict the
stage-3 price which, itself, is affected by their offers—both directly and by the information
revealed by stage-2 offers. Thus, to get an equilibrium for such a mechanism, a mapping
that takes both stages into account would have to be studied. Our approach decouples
stage-2 payoffs from what happens at stage-3 and, therefore, is simpler. Given that it has
good welfare properties, its simplicity is a virtue—both for us in analyzing the properties
of the mechanism and for those who play the game.
2 The environment
Our economy is a two-good endowment economy with N ex ante identical agents. Each
agent is endowed with the per capita endowment of each good, denoted (q¯, r¯) ∈ R2++.
First, nature draws a state-of-the-world z ∈ Z with probability τ0(z), a state which no
one observes. Then each agent gets a type realization, x ∈ X, with probability µz(x),
where x is private to the agent and is i.i.d. across people conditional on z. An agent of
type x ∈ X maximizes expected utility with ex post utility function, u(q, r;x, z), where
(q, r) ∈ R2+ is the vector of quantities of the two goods consumed. The function u(·, ·;x, z)
is strictly increasing, strictly concave, continuously twice differentiable, and satisfies Inada
conditions.
Both Z and X are finite sets. We assume that τ0(z) > 0 for each z ∈ Z and that
µz(x) > 0 for each x ∈ X and z ∈ Z.4 We also assume that x is informative in the sense
that z 6= z′ implies µz(x) 6= µz′(x) for some x ∈ X. (This informativeness assumption is
without loss of generality: If µz(x) = µz′(x) for all x ∈ X, then we treat z and z′ as a
single state z′′ with utility u(q, r;x, z′′) = τ0(z)u(q, r;x, z)+ τ0(z′)u(q, r;x, z′).) As noted
above, our interpretation is that x is an idiosyncratic taste shock and z is a common taste
shock. The realized type, x, plays two roles: it serves as private information about z and
it is private information about preferences.
We make two additional assumptions about preferences and the underlying uncer-
tainty. These assumptions ensure that there are ex post gains-from-trade among the
agents. Although these are numbered so that we can refer to their roles in the discussion,
they are maintained throughout. The first is about the way the unique outcome of a
static price-taking choice at a particular price depends on types.
A1. For p = r¯/q¯, there exists (small) κ = (κq, κr) > 0 such that for all κ ≤ κ, if
(q̂(x, κ), r̂(x, κ)) = argmax
∑
z∈Z
τx(z)u(q, r;x, z) (1)
4This assumption appears in most other related papers. Without this full support assumption, a
realization x could perfectly reveal the state even without any information aggregation. If it did, then the
information structure would violate the “informational smallness” assumption in McLean and Postlewaite
[8].
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subject to pq + r ≤ p(q¯ − 2κq) + (r¯ − 2κr), then x 6= x′ implies (q̂(x, κ), r̂(x, κ)) 6=
(q̂(x′, κ), r̂(x′, κ)). Here, τx(z) denotes the probability that the state is z conditional on
x.
Since u is strictly concave, by the Theorem of Maximum, A1 is satisfied if x 6= x′
implies (q̂(x, 0), r̂(x, 0)) 6= (q̂(x′, 0), r̂(x′, 0)). Thus, A1 is violated only for knife-edge
cases for two distinct aspects of the environment: the probabilities, τx(·) and τy(·),
and the utilities, u(q̂(x, 0), r̂(x, 0);x, ·) and u(q̂(x′, 0), r̂(x′, 0);x′, ·). Moreover, under A1,∑
z∈Z τx(z)u(q̂(x, 0), r̂(x, 0);x, z) >
∑
z∈Z τx(z)u(q, r;x, z) for some x, and hence, by con-
tinuity,
∑
z∈Z τx(z)u(q̂(x, κ), r̂(x, κ);x, z) >
∑
z∈Z τx(z)u(q, r;x, z) for small κ.
The second assumption is about an ex post limiting version in which there is a con-
tinuum of agents and no uncertainty.
A2. For each z ∈ Z, let Lz be the corresponding continuum-of-agents economy with
known aggregate state z and with fraction of type-x agents equal to µz(x). For each
z ∈ Z, Lz has a finite number of regular competitive equilibria (CE) (see Mas-Colell et
al. [10], Definition 17.D.1) in which every type trades.
As explained further below, A2, which is generic, is also used to get differentiability
of best responses in our stage-3 market game.
This is a convenient time to introduce a perturbation of the Lz economy. Let Lz(κ) =
Lz(κq, κr) be a continuum-of-agents economy defined by three properties: (i) it has a
known aggregate state z and has fraction of type-x agents equal to µz(x); (ii) the en-
dowment for each agent is equal to (q¯ − 2κq, r¯ − 2κr); (iii) there are (small) exogenous
per capita supplies κ = (κq, κr). The following lemma is a well known consequence of
regularity of CE in Lz.
Lemma 0. Fix a regular CE allocation for Lz, denoted (qzx, rzx)x∈X . There exists κ¯ > 0
such that for any κ ∈ [0, κ¯], Lz(κ) has a regular CE allocation, denoted (qz,κ, rz,κ) =
(qz,κx , r
z,κ
x )x∈X , that is continuous in κ.
By A2, if κ is small, (qz,κ, rz,κ) is such that every type trades, and, by continuity,
satisfies u(qz,κx , r
z,κ
x ;x, z) > u(q, r;x, z) for all x.
3 The mechanism
Before realizations of z and x occur, the N agents face a participation fee that consists of
small amounts of both goods, 2κ = (2κq, 2κr) ∈ (0, q¯)×(0, r¯). They simultaneously decide
whether or not to participate, which we label stage-1. Those who decide to participate
pay the entry fee and participate in the next stage, labelled stage-2. Those who decide
not to participate consume their endowments. We assume that the profile of participation
decisions is observed by the mechanism, but is otherwise private. The set of participants
is denoted N ′ and N ′ = |N ′|.
After the participation decisions and after the state and types are realized, each agent
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n ∈ N ′ chooses an offer an = (an,q, an,r) ∈ O, where
O = {(oq, or) ∈ [0, q¯ − 2κq]× [0, r¯ − 2κr] : oqor = 0}. (2)
This is stage-2. Then the participants are randomly divided into two groups in the
following way. Let η ∈ (0, 1) and let d(1− η)N ′e = M denote the smallest integer that is
no less than (1−η)N ′. An assignment, which assigns a number n′ to each agent n in a one-
to-one fashion, is drawn from the uniform distribution over the set of all such assignments,
and agent n is called active if n′ ≤ M and is called inactive if n′ > M . (Notice that the
identities of the inactive/active are random, but that M is a deterministic function of
N ′.) The payoff for an inactive agent n who made offer an = (an,q, an,r) is given by trade
at the fixed price, p = r¯/q¯, and his consumption bundle is given by
(q¯ − 2κq − an,q + an,r/p, r¯ − 2κr − an,r + pan,q) for n ∈ N ′ \M, (3)
where M is the set of active agents. Notice that if a type-x agent makes a stage-2 offer
to maximize expected utility contingent on being inactive and if the agent is selected to
be inactive, then that offer gives rise to the payoff (q̂(x, κ), r̂(x, κ)) in (1).
Next, the mechanism announces the histogram of the stage-2 offers of the active agents,
denoted ν : O → {0, 1, 2, ...,M}.5 For each a ∈ O, ν(a) is the number of active agents
whose stage-2 offers are a. Then, given that information, each active agent participates
in a market game, which is stage-3.
In stage-3, each active agent n makes an offer bn = (bn,q, bn,r) ∈ O and gets the
consumption bundle
(q¯ − 2κq − bn,q + bn,r/(R/Q), r¯ − 2κr − bn,r + (R/Q)bn,q) for n ∈M, (4)
where
(Q,R) =
∑
n′∈M
bn′ +Mκ. (5)
Here, κ = (κq, κr) are exogenous (small) quantities or offers, a formulation borrowed from
Dubey and Shubik [2]. The exogenous supplies in the stage-3 trade play three roles for
us: there is no need to define payoffs when there are zero-offers on one side of the market;
no-trade is eliminated as an equilibrium; and, most important, there are implied bounds
on the “price,” R/Q, that help us prove existence of the implied stage-2 game.6 Notice
5We could let the mechanism announce two histograms, one for active agents and one for inactive
agents. However, that would complicate the notation and would not change the results.
In a comment on an earlier draft, George Mailath pointed out that if only the histogram for inactive
agents were announced, then the ex ante tradeoff facing agents would not be present. However, as
explained further below, that would make stage-3 a game of incomplete information and would prevent
information aggregation from being achieved. In our specification, it is a game with complete information
on the equilibrium path. Our specification also has the virtue that the designer is not hiding information
that agents would like to have—namely, the types of the other active agents.
6Our market game is a version of what is known as the “buy-sell” game, which respects individual
rationality, as opposed to the “sell-all” version (see Shapley-Shubik [15]), which does not. Forges and
Minelli [3] use the sell-all version of the market game, which eliminates the first two roles of κ.
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that this “price” depends both on the offers of other active agents and on agent n’s offer.
Moreover, because we require offers to be in the set O, this “price” is not differentiable in
agent n’s offer at the offer (0, 0). That is one reason for assuming that every type trades
in at least one regular CE for the ex post limit economy, Lz(0).
Notice that the stage-3 exogenous offers are exactly half of the entry fees in per capita
terms. That allows us to prove the following.7
Lemma 1. If (2κq, 2κr) ∈ (0, q¯)× (0, r¯) and if η ≤ min{κq/2q¯, κr/2r¯}, then entry fees of
the participants cover the stage-2 and stage-3 costs of operating the mechanism.
As this indicates, the fraction of inactive agents, η, must be small relative to the entry
fees because the market does not clear for the inactive agents and additional resources
may be necessary to cover trades there.
The restriction in O that agents can only make offers on one side of the market plays
a significant role in our analysis. It is used to obtain uniqueness of best responses. The
following lemma shows that the restriction is not binding on the agent when there is no
private information, which is the case for the stage-3 game in the candidate equilibrium
we construct.
Lemma 2. Fix stage-3 offers of all other agents. Given those offers, for any offer b′ ∈
[0, q¯ − 2κq]× [0, r¯ − 2κr], there exists b′′ ∈ O that has the same payoff as b′.
Obviously, the restriction is also not binding in the same sense on payoffs for inactive
agents.
In what follows, we assume that the mechanism has selected a pair (κ, η) > 0 such that
κ is small in the sense that it is less than the thresholds given by A1 and Lemma 0, and such
that η ≤ min{κq/2q¯, κr/2r¯} so that Lemma 1 holds. We also let (q′, r′) = (q−2κq, r−2κr).
4 Existence of fully-revealing equilibrium
We begin with definitions of strategy and equilibrium. We use Perfect Bayesian Equi-
librium (PBE) as our solution concept and limit consideration to symmetric equilibria
in pure strategies, where symmetry holds for both strategies and beliefs.8 A symmetric
strategy profile is a triple (s1, s2, s3) = s defined as follows: (i) s1 ∈ {yes, no} is the par-
ticipation decision, where yes denotes willingness to participate and pay the entry fee,
while no denotes unwillingness; (ii) s2(x) ∈ O is the stage-2 strategy (if the agent has
decided to participate); (iii) s3(x, a, ν−a) ∈ O is the stage-3 strategy, where (x, a) denotes
the agent’s type and stage-2 action and ν−a denotes the announced histogram of offers of
active agents net of the agent’s own action. (For any a′ ∈ O, ν−a(a′) = ν(a′) if a 6= a′
and ν−a(a) = ν(a)− 1.)
Definition 1. A symmetric strategy profile s is a PBE if there exists a symmetric belief
7All proofs appear in the Appendix.
8Of course, this is without loss of generality regarding existence, but our uniqueness result is only
relative to this class.
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profile ϕ such that (a) (s1, s2) is optimal given s, (b) s3 is optimal against s and ϕ, and
(c) ϕ is consistent with s in the sense that it satisfies Bayes rule whenever possible. Here,
ϕ(x, a, ν−a) ∈ ∆(Z ×Θ), where Θ is the set of all configurations θ of type/stage-2-action
of the other active agents; i.e., θ : X ×O → {0, 1, 2, ...,M − 1} with M being the number
of active agents.
In our mechanism, agents only partially observe others’ participation decisions through
the number of active agents from the public announcement ν, which may range from 1
to d(1 − η)Ne. The stage-3 strategy, s3, has to specify an offer for any such possible
announcement. Agents also have to form beliefs about others at that stage. Because
we restrict our attention to symmetric equilibrium, an agent’s expected payoff at stage-3
depends only on his private history (x, a) and the configuration of other active agents’
private histories θ. This allows us to formulate the belief as a distribution over Z × Θ.
Moreover, even though all agents use the symmetric function ϕ to form their beliefs,
different agents can have different beliefs after seeing the same announcement ν because
they have different private histories and different interpretations of ν−a.
We are interested in PBE that have full participation and full information-aggregation.
Such an equilibrium is formally defined as follows.
Definition 2. A fully-revealing equilibrium is a PBE in which s1 = yes and x 6= x′
implies s2(x) 6= s2(x′).
The definition of a fully-revealing equilibrium restricts equilibrium behavior at stages
1 and 2, but not at stage-3, where most agents’ payoffs are determined. Proposition 1
establishes existence of fully revealing equilibria whose stage-3 behavior is arbitrarily close
to a given profile of ex post CE’s. To set the stage for that proposition, we first define
the sense in which consumption is random in our model.
Definition 3. An allocation is a mapping c : XN×ΩN×Z → (R2+)N that maps the profile
of agents’ types, denoted ζN = (ζ1, ..., ζn, ...ζN) ∈ XN , the profile of agents’ activeness
statuses, denoted ωN = (ω1, ..., ωN) ∈ ΩN , where ΩN = {ωN ∈ {0, 1}N :
∑N
n=1 ωn =
d(1 − η)Ne}, and ωn = 0 means inactive and ωn = 1 means active, and the state of the
world, z ∈ Z, to a profile of consumption-bundles for each agent.
For any symmetric strategy profile, s, with full participation—i.e., with s1 = yes—
there is a corresponding allocation, denoted cs. While there are three sources of such
uncertainty in our model, whose realizations are ζN , ωN , and z, cs does not depend on
z directly because no agent ever observes z. However, the distribution of cs depends on
z because the distribution of ζN depends on z. Also, because the strategy profile s is
symmetric, for any given ζN all active agents of the same type have the same stage-3
consumption. Because of this symmetry, we also use cs1,x to denote the consumption
bundle of any active agent of type x.
Proposition 1. Fix an ex post regular CE profile {(qz,κ, rz,κ)}z∈Z in which every type
trades. Then there exists a number N¯ and a sequence of fully-revealing equilibria {sN =
(sN1 , s
N
2 , s
N
3 )}∞N=N¯ such that
lim
N→∞
cs
N
1,x = (q
z,κ
x , r
z,κ
x ) for all x ∈ X (6)
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almost surely conditional on z for each z ∈ Z.
We prove Proposition 1 by first specifying a candidate equilibrium strategy profile,
denoted s∗ = (s∗1, s
∗
2, s
∗
3), and a corresponding belief profile, ϕ
∗, where all but s∗3 are given
explicitly. The specification of s∗3 has to be defined for all possible announcements ν;
has to satisfy the limiting property (6); and has to be optimal with respect to a belief.
We meet these conditions by a belief formulation that reduces optimality to finding an
equilibrium in a suitably defined complete-information static game. We give a general
existence result for that game that allows us to specify s∗3 for an arbitrary ν and we
provide a lower hemi-continuity result for that equilibrium correspondence that allows
us to establish the limiting properties required by (6). After specifying s∗3, we prove the
optimality of the following s∗1 and s
∗
2: s
∗
1 = yes (full participation) and s
∗
2(x) is the stage-2
offer that is optimal for a type-x agent contingent on being inactive so that the implied
payoff if inactive is (q̂(x, κ), r̂(x, κ)) as given in (1). It follows from A1 that x 6= x′ implies
s∗2(x) 6= s∗2(x′). Therefore, s∗ is fully revealing.
When the observed announcement after stage-2 is consistent with (s∗1, s
∗
2), Bayes rule
requires the agent to have a degenerate belief that concentrates on the configuration
implied by the announcement. For other announcements, our candidate belief also has a
degenerate belief formulated as follows.
First, we order the elements of X so that q̂(xi, κ) < q̂(xi+1, κ) for i ∈ {1, 2, ..., |X|−1},
where |X| denotes the cardinality ofX and where q̂(x, κ) is given in (1). Next, we partition
the interval [0, 2q¯] into |X| subintervals indexed by that ordering as follows:
I(xi) =

[
0, q̂(x2,κ)+q̂(x1,κ)
2
)
for i = 1
[
q̂(xi,κ)+q̂(xi−1,κ)
2
, q̂(xi+1,κ)+q̂(xi,κ)
2
)
for i = 2, 3, ..., |X| − 1
[
q̂(xi,κ)+q̂(xi−1,κ)
2
, 2q¯
]
for i = |X|
. (7)
For |X| = 2, I(x1) and I(x2) are depicted as follows:
[- - - - - - - - I(x1) - - - - - - - - -)[- - - - - - - I(x2) - - - - - - - - - - -]
[—————•————————•————————•——————]
0 q̂(x1, κ) q̂(x2, κ) 2q¯
Our candidate for equilibrium beliefs is that each agent forms a degenerate distribu-
tion over the type/stage-2-action configuration of the other active agents by treating an
observed stage-2 action in I(xi) as coming from an agent of type xi. Formally, for any
a ∈ O, let
q1(a) = q¯
′ − aq + ar
p
∈ [0, 2q¯]. (8)
If M is the number of active agents in the observed histogram ν, the belief of an agent
with private history (x, a), denoted ϕ∗(x, a, ν−a), puts probability 1 on the configuration
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θν−a defined by
θν−a(y, a
′) =
{
ν−a(a′) if q1(a′) ∈ I(y)
0 otherwise
. (9)
An associated marginal distribution over Z is given by the posterior derived from Bayes
rule using the type-configuration of all active agents σ : X → {0, 1, ...,M} defined by
σ(y) =
{ ∑
a′∈O θν−a(y, a
′) if y 6= x∑
a′∈O θν−a(x, a
′) + 1 if y = x
. (10)
Notice that the belief ϕ∗ is consistent with (s∗1, s
∗
2).
We call a type-x agent a nondefector if the agent’s stage-2 action is in I(x); otherwise,
the agent is called a defector. (A defector uses the first line of (10), while a nondefector
uses the second line.) That is, under our candidate belief, each agent believes that all
others are nondefectors, and he believes that all others believe that all are nondefectors,
even though he may be a defector himself. When all agents are nondefectors, the type-
configuration σ given by (10) coincides with the true configuration and is commonly
known among active agents. Moreover, there is also a common belief about z derived
from σ via Bayes rule. Therefore, the stage-3 continuation game can be regarded as a
complete-information game in which the common posterior distribution over z appears
as a preference parameter. Once we prove a general existence result for that game under
arbitrary σ, we can use it to define s∗3 for nondefectors under any arbitrary ν. We can
also easily describe the best response of any defector because the defector believes that
all other agents are nondefectors who believe that they are in a game with nondefectors
only.
However, in order to establish the limiting behavior of stage-3 strategies as given in
(6), we need to show existence of equilibrium behavior that converges to the given CE
allocations. To do that, it is convenient to treat the above stage-3 continuation game as a
game that depends on three parameters (1/M, µ, φ) ∈ [0, 1]×∆(X)×∆(Z), all determined
by σ, a game denoted E(1/M, µ, φ). In this game, there are M players; the action set
for each player is O; the known number of players of type-x as a fraction of M is µ(x);
each agent has endowment (q¯′, r′); there are per capita exogenous offers κ = (κq, κr); and
the payoff for type-x players is the expected value of u w.r.t. the common φ ∈ ∆(Z)
evaluated at the consumption implied by the stage-3 market game (see (4)).
We can now translate limiting property (6) into a characterization of the equilibrium
correspondence of E(1/M, µ, φ) for limiting parameters. The parameter values for the
limit economy Lz(κ) is given by (1/M, µ, φ) = (0, µz, δz) (and, hence, M = ∞), where
δz is the dirac measure concentrated at z, and the competitive allocation of interest in
Lz(κ) is (qz,κ, rz,κ) given by Lemma 0. In terms of offers in O, that CE allocation is
βz,κ = 〈βz,κq (x), βz,κr (x)〉x∈X , where
βz,κq (x) = max{q¯′ − qz,κx , 0} and βz,κr (x) = max{r¯′ − rz,κx , 0}. (11)
Our next lemma gives both the general existence result and the characterization result
for parameters close to (0, µz, δz).
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Lemma 3. (i) The set of symmetric equilibria for the game E(1/M, σ/M, φ) is not empty.
(ii) Fix z ∈ Z and a regular CE allocation (qz,κ, rz,κ) for Lz(κ) in which every type trades.
Let Λ = [0, 1]×∆(X)×∆(Z) and let λz0 = (0, µz, δz). There exists an open neighborhood
of λz0, denoted Λz, with Λz ⊂ Λ, and a continuous function fz : Λz → OX such that
fz(λ
z
0) = β
z,κ (see (11)) and such that (1/M, σ/M, φσ) ∈ Λz implies that fz(1/M, σ/M, φσ)
is a symmetric equilibrium in E(M,σ/M, φσ).
The proof of (i) is a routine application of Brouwer’s fixed point theorem.9 The proof
of (ii) is an application of the implicit function theorem.10 This is applicable because
positive trade implies differentiability of best responses in the stage-3 game.11
Now, let
βσ =
{
fz(1/M, σ/M, φ
σ) if (1/M, σ/M, φσ) ∈ Λz for some z ∈ Z
any Lemma 3 (i) equilibrium otherwise
. (12)
Notice that this mapping is well-defined iff Λz ∩ Λz′ = ∅ for all z 6= z′. Because λz0 6= λz′0
for all z 6= z′ and Z is finite, we can choose the Λz’s to be disjoint. We describe the
strategies s∗3 in terms of the β
σ mapping.
For a type-x nondefector—i.e., a type-x agent with a ∈ I(x)—his stage-3 action,
s∗3(x, a, ν
−a), is βσ, where σ is derived from ν according to (10). For a defector, the
strategy is a bit more complicated. A defector is an agent with private history (x, a, ν−a)
and q1(a) ∈ I(x′) for x 6= x′. Let σ∗ be this agent’s belief about the type-configuration
of all active agents under ϕ∗ and let σ′ be the type-configuration that he believes other
agents believe (see (10)). (That is, σ′(x) = σ∗(x)−1, σ′(x′) = σ∗(x′)+1, and σ′(y) = σ∗(y)
for all y /∈ {x, x′}.) Then, s∗3(x, a, ν−a), our candidate stage-2 strategy, is
s∗3(x, a, ν
−a) = argmax
b∈O
∑
z∈Z
φσ
∗
(z)u(q¯′ +
brQ− − bqR−
R− + br
, r¯′ +
bqR− − brQ−
Q− + bq
;x, z), (13)
where φσ
∗
(z) is derived from σ∗ using Bayes rule and where
(Q−, R−) = Mκ+
∑
y 6=x
σ∗(y)βσ
′
(y) + (σ∗(x)− 1)βσ′(x).
(The candidate s∗3(x, a, ν
−a) for a nondefector is a special case of (13) with σ′ = σ∗.) This
construction implies that s∗3 is optimal against s
∗
3 and ϕ
∗. Moreover, (6) follows directly
from part (ii) of Lemma 3 and (12).
9It does, however, depend on the constraint bqbr = 0. With it, the best response, which is the mapping
studied in order to get a fixed point, is a function; without that constraint, the mapping is not necessarily
a convex correspondence. Dubey-Shubik [2] obtain a similar result.
10If we drop the every-type-trades assumption, then this result may go through if we allow agents to
use any offer (oq, or) ∈ [0, q¯]× [0, r¯]. While this would avoid issues with differentiability, it would require
us to use a version of the implicit function theorem that applies to correspondences.
11The only other lower hemicontinuity result for market games seems to be that in Mas-Colell [9], but
he uses a very different model. As he says, his version is not a game because each agent’s offers are
constrained by ex post budget balance, a constraint which depends on the actions of others.
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What remains is to show that both s∗1 and s
∗
2 are optimal given that other agents
follow the candidate equilibrium. First we consider the optimality of s∗2, assuming that all
agents participate. An agent at the stage-2 faces a tradeoff. Conditional on being inactive,
playing s∗2 is optimal for any N . Conditional on being active, a type-x agent could gain
by playing something not in I(x). By doing that, the agent influences the beliefs and,
thereby, the stage-3 actions of other active agents. To demonstrate that the trade-off
is resolved in favor of the inactive case, we first show that an agent’s expected stage-3
payoff conditional on each state z converges to the payoff according to the CE allocation,
(qz,κ, rz,κ) independent of his offer made at stage-2. In this argument only those type
configurations, σ’s, that are close to the limit configurations are relevant as they occur
with probability close to one as the population gets large. Hence, the arbitrariness of
the selection in the second line of (12) does not matter. As a result, the gain from
manipulating stage-3 beliefs is smaller than the loss implied by playing something that is
not in I(x)—a play which, by construction, is bounded away from s∗2(x).
Finally, we need to show that s∗1 = yes is optimal. In order to show this, we use both
A1 and A2. Conditional on being inactive, any agent’s stage-2 payoff is no less than that
implied by no-trade, and, by A1, is strictly better for some types than consuming the
initial endowment for small κ. Conditional on being active, the agent’s stage-3 payoff is
close to the CE allocation in Lz(κ) conditional on any z. Because every type trades in
that CE, that payoff is also strictly better than no-trade, and, by Lemma 0, strictly better
than consuming the initial endowment for small κ. As a result, participation is strictly
better than no-trade in both contingencies, and the result follows.
5 Almost ex post efficiency
According to Proposition 1, associated with any regular CE allocation (in which every type
trades) in Lz(κ) is a sequence of fully-revealing equilibria whose stage-3 behavior converges
almost surely to that CE allocation. This suggests that such equilibria are in some
approximate sense ex post efficient. However, because the convergence is probabilistic, the
standard definition of Pareto efficiency does not apply. Therefore, we adapt the definition
of almost ex post efficiency in McLean and Postlewaite [8] and Gul and Postlewaite [6]
who have settings like ours. Using that definition, we show that our mechanism achieves
the same kind of efficiency as the direct mechanisms constructed in those papers.
We define almost ex post efficiency in terms of a notion of ex post pareto-superiority.
Definition 4. Let c : XN × ΩN × Z → (R2+)N be an allocation (see Definition 3).
(i) We say that c is feasible if ∑
n
cn(ζ
N , ωN , z) ≤ N(q¯, r¯) (14)
for all (ζN , ωN , z) ∈ XN × ΩN × Z.
(ii) Let {Y (z, ωN)} be a collection of subsets of XN , one subset for each (z, ωN) ∈ Z×ΩN .
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We say that c′ is ex post ε-pareto-superior to c w.r.t. the collection {Y (z, ωN)} if
u[c′n(ζ
N , ωN , z); ζn, z] > u[cn(ζ
N , ωN , z); ζn, z] + ε for each n (15)
for some (z, ωN) and some ζN ∈ Y (z, ωN).
(iii) We say that a feasible c is ex post ε-efficient if there exists a collection {Y (z, ωN)}
with P[Y (z, ωN)|z, ωN ] ≥ 1− ε for each (z, ωN) and such that no other feasible allocation
c′ is ex post ε-pareto-superior to c w.r.t. {Y (z, ωN)}.
When ε = 0, the above definition coincides with the usual definition of ex post effi-
ciency.12 And, except for the presence of ωN , this definition coincides with the definitions
in McLean and Postlewaite [8] and in Gul and Postlewaite [6].
Here, then, is our efficiency result.
Proposition 2. Let ε > 0 be given. There exists κ¯ and N(κ, η) such that if (κ, η) satisfies
κ¯ > κ ≥ 4η(q¯, r¯) > 0 (16)
and N > N(κ, η), then there exists a fully-revealing equilibrium whose outcome is ex post
ε-efficient.
The proof shows that the fully-revealing equilibrium constructed in Proposition 1 is
ex post ε-efficient, provided that the parameters of the mechanism satisfy (16). We be-
gin with a regular CE allocation in Lz(0) in which every type trades, denoted (qz,0, rz,0).
Proposition 1 shows that there is a sequence of fully-revealing equilibria whose outcome
conditional on state z approaches the CE allocation (qz,κ, rz,κ), which, by Lemma 0, is
close to (qz,0, rz,0) for small κ. The main challenge is to construct the events {Y (z, ωN)}.
The construction uses the type configurations that are close to the limit distribution con-
ditional on z and for which the equilibrium stage-3 offers are close to (qz,κ, rz,κ). By
Proposition 1, that event has arbitrarily high probability. After providing that construc-
tion, we complete the argument by using the first fundamental welfare theorem in the
following way.
Consider a type-configuration realization, σN , belonging to the event Y (z, ωN), and
consider the allocation cs
N
derived from the equilibrium outcome of the constructed fully-
revealing equilibrium sN = (sN1 , s
N
2 , s
N
3 ). Given the realization (σ
N , ωN , z), cs
N
gives rise
to a deterministic allocation. (Notice that because cs
N
is symmetric, σN is sufficient to
determine the consumption bundle for active agents of each type.) For that same type-
configuration and for the state z, consider an alternative N -agent economy in which each
agent has the utility function u(q, r, ;x, z), but the endowment for each active agent is
(q¯ + κq, r¯ + κr), while the endowment for each inactive agent is (0, 0). Let c′′ be the
competitive allocation for this alternative economy that is close to (qz,κ, rz,κ) for κ small.
(By (16), η is small and existence is guaranteed by regularity.) By contradiction, let c′ be
feasible and be an allocation that is ex post ε-pareto superior to cs
N
under the realization
12Notice that when ε = 0, (15) requires the allocation c′n(ζ
N , ωN , z) to be strictly better than
cn(ζ
N , ωN , z) for all n. This is without loss of generality: any allocation that is weakly better for
all n and strictly better for some n can be modified to be strictly better off for all n because goods are
divisible and utilities are continuous.
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(σN , ωN , z). Also, let c′′ = (c′′0, c
′′
1) and c
sN = (cs
N
0 , c
sN
1 ), where in each case the subscript
0 is the part of the allocation that pertains to inactive agents and the subscript 1 is the
part that pertains to active agents. By definition, c′′0 ≡ (0, 0) because inactive agents have
zero endowments in the alternative economy.
By our construction of Y (z, ωN), both c′′1 and c
sN
1 (under realizations (σ
N , ωN , z) with
σN ∈ Y (z, ωN)) approach the same limit, (qz, rz), as (κ,N) → (0,∞). Therefore, by
(15) and the fact that c′ is ex post ε-pareto-superior to cs
N
, for N sufficiently large and κ
sufficiently small, c′ is pareto superior to c′′. (This uses c′′0 ≡ (0, 0).) However, for small
enough η, c′′ uses more resources than c′. This contradicts the first welfare theorem; an
economy with fewer resources and the same strictly increasing utility functions cannot
have a feasible allocation that is pareto superior to c′′, which is the competitive allocation
in the alternative economy.
6 Uniqueness of equilibrium
If there are multiple regular competitive equilibria in the ex post limit economy, Lz, then
there are also multiple fully-revealing equilibria in our mechanism. Here we show that if
the competitive demand for good-q is monotone in Lz for each z ∈ Z, and if some mild
additional conditions hold, then any equilibrium is fully revealing and can be characterized
asymptotically by the unique CE.13 We split the argument into two parts. We first give
sufficient conditions for uniqueness within the class of full-participation equilibria. Then,
we give additional conditions under which full participation also obtains.
6.1 Uniqueness of full-participation equilibria
There are three such conditions. The first is a stronger assumption about the informa-
tiveness of the type realizations.
U1. Let Y = {Y1, Y2} be any bipartition of X and let µz(Yi) ≡
∑
y∈Yi µz(y). For any
z 6= z′, µz(Y1) 6= µz′(Y1).
This implies that for any partition Y = {Y1, ..., YK} of X with K ≥ 2 and for any z 6= z′,
there exists some k such that µz(Yk) 6= µz′(Yk). Although this assumption is stronger
than our original informativeness assumption, parameters for which it does not hold are
nongeneric.
The second is a modification of the mechanism.
U2. If all agents make the same stage-2 offer, then the game ends at stage-2.
This says that the market shuts down after stage-2 if all agents announce the same offer at
stage-2. Under A1, this modification rules out any full-participation equilibrium in which
13This monotonicity assumption helps simplify our notation and the statement of results, but is not
essential for our uniqueness result. As noted below, uniqueness of CE in Lz would suffice.
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all agents make the same stage-2 offer, but does not change any other symmetric equilib-
rium with full participation. In particular, this modification does not affect the existence
of a fully-revealing equilibrium. Finally, because all agents have the same endowments,
in the rare event that every agent receives the same type realization in a fully-revealing
equilibrium, such shutting down is costless in terms of realized welfare because in that
rare event there is no role for trade.
The third is a restriction on off-equilibrium beliefs.
U3. If a single defecting offer is observed at stage-2, then it is believed to come from
some set of types A ⊂ X. Moreover, that belief and the equilibrium play of other agents
are used via Bayes rule to form a belief over Z and the type configuration of other active
agents.
Along the equilibrium path of a symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies, the equilibrium
belief associates each equilibrium stage-2 offer a with a set of types and then applies
Bayes rule to derive a belief about the type configuration and the state. U3 requires
off-equilibrium beliefs to be derived using the same procedure, but allows there to be
an arbitrary set of types, A, to be associated with an arbitrary deviating offer. The
assumption that A is common to all nondefectors is convenient, but not crucial. The
crucial part of U3 is that a set of types is assumed for the defector and that Bayes
rule is used based on that set. As a result, U3 excludes off-equilibrium beliefs that
allow the defector to signal something about other agents’ types or about the state in
a way that is not warranted by the defector’s private information. This requirement is
essentially the requirement for “reasonable” belief systems in Fudenberg and Tirole [4].
Their requirement says that inferences drawn from a defecting action should be limited
to the defector’s type (that is, no signaling about what you don’t know). We need to
augment their requirement with the use of Bayes rule because of the presence in our
model of a payoff-relevant state-of-the-world. Doing so is reasonable because an agent is
trying to update his belief about the type profile and the state-of-the-world, which are
exogenous.14
Proposition 3. Assume U1-U3. Suppose that the competitive demand for good-q is
monotone in Lz for each z ∈ Z. Then, there exists N¯ such that for all N > N¯ , any
symmetric PBE in pure strategies sN = (sN1 , s
N
2 , s
N
3 ) with s
N
1 = yes (full participation) is
fully revealing.
We show by contradiction that any equilibrium with full participation is fully revealing
for sufficiently largeN . First, we use U2 to eliminate a complete pooling equilibrium—one
in which s2(x) = s2(y) for all x, y ∈ X. Next, we consider a semi-pooling equilibrium—
one in which there is a partition Y = {Y1, ..., YK} of X with |X| > K ≥ 2 such that
s2(y) = s2(y
′) if y, y′ ∈ Yk and s2(y) 6= s2(y′) if y ∈ Yk and y′ ∈ Yk′ with k 6= k′. The
main body of the proof shows that, even under a semi-pooling equilibrium, the stage-3
outcome converges to the unique competitive allocation. Of course, this convergence will
14A less restrictive extension would allow the off-equilibrium belief to associate a deviating offer with
a distribution of types and would then employ Bayes rule to pin down the belief about the state and the
type configuration of other agents. However, it is rather complicated to formulate the use of Bayes rule
under this assumption and doing so does not seem to affect our main results.
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fail without uniqueness of the CE. We also make use of U1 and U3: U1 is used to deal
with the asymmetric information that exists in a semi-pooling equilibrium, while U3 is
used to restrict off-equilibrium beliefs. Then we eliminate any semi-pooling equilibrium
by an argument that resembles the main idea in the proof of Proposition 1: because a
defection by one agent has a vanishing effect on the beliefs of other agents, an agent is
induced to defect from a semi-pooling equilibrium and play the stage-2 strategy that is
best contingent on becoming inactive.
6.2 Uniqueness of full participation
We show that if we amend the participation stage and if we impose a further refinement,
then under U1-U3 all equilibria have full participation. Here is the modification of the
participation stage.
U4. After the mechanism receives all the participation decisions, it shuts down and
refunds all the entry fees if some agents refuse to participate; otherwise; it proceeds to
the next stage.
As with modification U2, U4 does not affect any fully-revealing equilibrium or any of our
earlier results.
Now we turn to the refinement. In the modified mechanism under U4, a symmetric
pure strategy may still be rewritten as s = (s1, s2, s3), but now (s2, s3) only specifies what
happens in the two-stage market-game mechanism when all agents participate (and when
full participation becomes common knowledge among them). Thus, for any candidate
equilibrium (s1, s2, s3), we may regard stage-1 as an N -agent simultaneous game where
the action set for each agent n is {yes, no} and the payoff under a profile in which some
agent says no is (q, r) for everyone and can be computed from (s2, s3) otherwise.15 We
call this game the stage-1 game induced by s. Our refinement is the following.
U5. The equilibrium s has the property that s1 does not use a weakly dominated action
in the stage-1 game induced by s.
Proposition 4. Assume U1-U5 and suppose that the competitive demand for good-q
is monotone in Lz for each z ∈ Z. Then, there exists N¯ such that for all N > N¯ , any
symmetric PBE in pure strategies is fully revealing.
The logic of the proof is simple. An agent at stage-1 thinks about two alternatives.
Either everyone else participates or not. If not, then the agent is indifferent between
{yes, no} because both leave the agent with the endowment (q, r). If everyone else par-
ticipates, then, according to the refinement, the agent computes an expected payoff from
participating from the unique continuation equilibrium of the previous subsection, a pay-
off that exceeds that of the endowment, the payoff from playing no. Therefore, playing
no is a weakly dominated action in the sense of U5.
15Here we assume that after observing that the mechanism continues after stage-1 (which implies
that all agents participate), agents do not update their beliefs about the fundamentals (the state and
other agents’ types). Because agents observe nothing when making their participation decisions, this
assumption is consistent with U3.
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Finally, under U1-U5, we can also show that all equilibria are ex post ε-efficient for
large N . This result does not directly follow from the statement of Proposition 2 because
it requires that the allocations for all equilibria converge to the corresponding limiting CE
uniformly. However, the proof of Proposition 2 does establish such uniform convergence.
Therefore, the result follows.
7 Concluding remarks
Given the finite population, the threat of being inactive plays a crucial role. Without
it, there would be no penalty attached to stage-2 actions that are devoted entirely to
manipulating the beliefs of others and such manipulation could be desirable for any finite
N . Therefore, we strongly suspect that a fully revealing equilibrium does not exist if
η = 0. In this respect, there is a significant distinction between the model with a finite
number of agents and the same model with a continuum of agents. In the continuum
version as usually formulated, one agent cannot manipulate the beliefs of others and a
fully revealing equilibrium exists even if η = 0.
We have assumed that agents make their participation decisions before their types
are realized. Alternatively, we could assume that agents make that decision after they
know their types. All our results would go through without any significant change. In
particular, A2 implies that, for small κ’s, all types have positive gains from trade in the
CE allocation in Lz(κ) for all z and the expected payoffs from stage-3 trade converges to
that allocation conditional on z. Thus, the arguments for willingness to participate go
through without any essential changes.
One special assumption that we have not commented on is the assumption that all
agents have the same endowment. If not, then we would need a way of describing endow-
ment patterns as we vary the number of agents. One way would be to have a finite number
of possible endowment types and to have deterministic replication over that finite-type
profile with preference types drawn randomly as we do. Provided that endowments are
positive, we could preserve the Lemma-1 feasibility result. We could also handle known
preference heterogeneity in the same way. The one place where known heterogeneity would
play a role is in our uniqueness argument. If agents’ endowments are heterogeneous (or
there is another source of known heterogeneity), then assumption U2 would need to be
modified. We would require that stage-3 be shut down whenever all agents with the same
endowment make the same offer at stage-2. That would weaken our detail-freeness claim.
Finally, two special cases of the information structure deserve comment. All our results
hold for the pure-private value case in which the state z does not affect preferences. In that
case, the state remains a source of aggregate risk because it determines the proportions
of agents’ types. Therefore, stage-2 remains useful because information aggregation is
important for ex post efficiency. In contrast, the pure common-value case in which types
are purely signals and do not affect preferences makes the model irrelevant for two reasons
related to the no-trade theorem. First, our existence result requires that every type trades
at the limit economy with κ = 0, an assumption that depends on the appearance of types
in preferences. Second, if types do not appear in preferences, then trade disappears at
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stage-3 as κ→ 0 and agents will not want to enter in the presence of an entry fee.
8 Appendix: Proofs
The proofs are set out by section of the paper.
8.1 The mechanism
Lemma 1. If (2κq, 2κr) ∈ (0, q¯)× (0, r¯) and if η ≤ min{κq/2q¯, κr/2r¯}, then entry fees of
the participants cover the stage-1 and stage-2 costs of operating the mechanism.
Proof. The mechanism has to supply at most N ′(κq, κr) units of the two goods for the
stage-2 trades. For stage-2 trades, there are two extreme cases: first, all agents offer all
of their endowed r good at the first stage, in which case the mechanism has to supply at
most ηN ′q units of the q good; second, all agents offer all of their endowed q goods in the
first stage, in which case the mechanism has to supply at most ηNr units of the r good.
Thus, the total supply from the mechanism for the q good is less than (remember that
we have η ≤ κq/2q)
N ′κq + ηN ′q ≤ 1.5N ′κq < 2N ′κq.
A symmetric argument shows that the the total supply from the mechanism for the r
good is less than 2N ′κr. This guarantees feasibility.
Lemma 2. Fix stage-3 offers of all other agents. Given those offers, for any offer b′ ∈
[0, q¯ − 2κq]× [0, r¯ − 2κr], there exists b′′ ∈ O that has the same payoff as b′.
Proof. Let (Q−, R−) ∈ R2++ be total offers of other agents (including the exogenous
offers). For any b ∈ [0, q¯ − 2κq] × [0, r¯ − 2κr], (4) implies that the corresponding payoffs
are
q(bq, br) = q¯ − 2κq + brQ− − bqR−
R− + br
and r(bq, br) = r¯ − 2κr + bqR− − brQ−
Q− + bq
. (17)
Case (i): b′rQ− − b′qR− > 0. In this case, let b′′q = 0 and let b′′r be the unique solution
to
b′′rQ−
R− + b′′r
=
b′rQ− − b′qR−
R− + b′r
≡ γ. (18)
It follows that γ ∈ (0, Q−) and that the solution is b′′r = R−γ/(Q− − γ). Therefore, by
(18), q(b′′q , b
′′
r) = q(b
′
q, b
′
r). Also,
r(b′′q , b
′′
r)− r¯ = b′′r = R−γ/(Q− − γ) = r(b′q, b′r)− r¯,
where the last equality follows from the definition of γ.
Case (ii): b′rQ− − b′qR− < 0. This is completely analogous, but with b′′r = 0.
Case (iii): b′rQ− − b′qR− = 0. Here, of course, we let b′′q = b′′r = 0.
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8.2 Existence of fully-revealing equilibrium
Lemma 3. (i) The set of symmetric equilibria for the game E(1/M, σ/M, φ) is not empty.
(ii) Fix z ∈ Z and a regular CE allocation (qz,κ, rz,κ) for Lz(κ) in which every type trades.
Let Λ = [0, 1]×∆(X)×∆(Z) and let λz0 = (0, µz, δz). There exists an open neighborhood
of λz0, denoted Λz, with Λz ⊂ Λ, and a continuous function fz : Λz → OX such that
fz(λ
z
0) = β
z,κ (see (11)) and such that (1/M, σ/M, φσ) ∈ Λz implies that fz(1/M, σ/M, φσ)
is a symmetric equilibrium in E(M,σ/M, φσ).
Proof. (i) We apply Brouwer’s fixed point theorem. Let q¯′ = q¯−2κq and let r¯′ = r¯−2κr,
and let S = {[0, q¯′] × [0, r¯′]}X , which is compact and convex. We let s = {sy}y∈X with
sy = (syq , s
y
r) denote a generic element of S. For s ∈ S and x ∈ X, let F : S → S be given
by
Fx(s) = argmax
b∈O
Hx(b;Q−, R−), (19)
where
Hx(b;Q−, R−) =
∑
z∈Z
φ(z)u(q¯′ +
brQ− − bqR−
R− + br
, r¯′ +
bqR− − brQ−
Q− + bq
;x, z) (20)
and
(Q−, R−) = Mκ+
∑
y 6=x
σ(y)sy + [σ(x)− 1]sx.
Here φ is the common posterior on z. By the definition of the game E(M,σ/M, φ, κ), a
fixed point of F is an equilibrium. (Although the domain of the mapping, S, does not
satisfy bqbr = 0, the range does. Therefore, any fixed point satisfies bqbr = 0.)
It remains to show that Fx(s) is unique and is continuous in s. We start with unique-
ness. Notice that (Q−, R−) ∈ R2++ for any s ∈ S.
Because of the bqbr = 0 constraint in (19), it is helpful to consider Hx(bq, 0;Q−, R−)
and Hx(0, br;Q−, R−) separately, where
Hx(bq, 0;Q−, R−) =
∑
z∈Z
φ(z)u(q¯′ − bq, r¯′ + bqR−
Q− + bq
;x, z) ≡ g(bq),
and
Hx(0, br;Q−, R−) =
∑
z∈Z
φ(z)u(q¯′ +
brQ−
R− + br
, r¯′ − br;x, z) ≡ h(br).
For any (Q−, R−) ∈ R2++, the functions fq(bq) = r¯′ + bqR−Q−+bq and fr(br) = q¯′ +
brQ−
R−+br
are strictly concave. Then, because u is strictly concave and because a strictly increasing
concave function of a concave function is strictly concave, both g and h are strictly
concave. It follows that g has a unique maximum and that h has a unique maximum,
denoted bˆq and bˆr, respectively. Moreover, by the Inada conditions on u, these maxima
are characterized by
bˆq =
{
0 if g′(0) ≤ 0
satisfies g′(bˆq) = 0 if g′(0) > 0
, (21)
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and
bˆr =
{
0 if h′(0) ≤ 0
satisfies h′(bˆr) = 0 if h′(0) > 0
. (22)
Therefore, a sufficient condition for uniqueness is min{g′(0), h′(0)} ≤ 0, where
g′(0) =
∑
z∈Z
φ(z)
[
−uq (q¯′;x, z) + ur (r¯′;x, z) R−
Q−
]
,
and
h′(0) =
∑
z∈Z
φ(z)
[
uq (q¯
′;x, z)
Q−
R−
− ur (r¯′;x, z)
]
.
Note that
sign[h′(0)] = sign[
R−
Q−
h′(0)] = sign[−g′(0)] = −sign[g′(0)], (23)
which implies min{g′(0), h′(0)} ≤ 0.
Now we turn to continuity in s, which follows if (bˆq, bˆr) is continuous in (Q−, R−). By
(23), g′(0) = 0 iff h′(0) = 0. That and (21) and (22) imply that max{bˆq, bˆr} satisfies a
first-order condition with equality. Then, the implicit-function theorem applied to that
first-order condition gives the required continuity.
(ii) First, we give a claim that is used to evaluate a determinant that appears when we
verify a full-rank condition.
Claim 1. Let an = (a1, ..., an) ∈ Rn, kn = (k1, ..., kn) ∈ Rn, and Pn = a′nkn − In (where
In is the n× n identity matrix). Then |Pn| = (−1)n+1(
∑n
i=1 aiki − 1).
Proof. The proof is by induction on n. The claim holds for n = 1. Now, suppose it holds
for n. By definition, Pn = [k1a′n, k2a
′
n, ..., kna
′
n]− In. If kn+1 = 0, then |Pn+1| = −1 |Pn|.
Thus, we can assume that Πn+1i=1 ki 6= 0. Then,
|Pn+1| =
∣∣[k1a′n+1, k2a′n+1, ..., kna′n+1, kn+1a′n+1]− In∣∣ = (Πn+1i=1 ki) ∣∣∣∣( A bc − 1
kn+1
)∣∣∣∣ ,
where
A = [a′n, ...., a
′
n]− diag(
1
k1
, ...,
1
kn
),b′ = (1/k1, 0, ..., 0), and c = (an+1, ..., an+1).
Then,
|Pn+1| = (Πn+1i=1 ki)[−(1/kn+1)|A|+ (−1)n(1/k1]|B|],
where
B =

a2 a2 − 1/k2 . . . a2
...
...
. . .
...
an an . . . an − 1/kn
an+1 an+1 . . . an+1

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and
|B| =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣

a2 −1/k2 . . . 0
...
...
. . .
...
an 0 . . . −1/kn
an+1 0 . . . 0

∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ = (−1)
n−1an+1
(
Πn+1i=2 (−1/ki)
)
= an+1
1
Πn+1i=2 ki
.
By the induction hypothesis,
|A| = (−1)n+1 1
Πni=1ki
(
n∑
i=1
kiai − 1).
Therefore,
|Pn+1| = (−1)n+2(
n∑
i=1
kiai − 1) + (−1)nan+1kn+1 = (−1)n+2(
n+1∑
i=1
kiai − 1),
as required.2
Now we prove (ii). Let (qz,κ, rz,κ) be the given regular CE where every type trades
in Lz(κ) and let pz,κ be the corresponding price, and let βz,κ be the corresponding offers
given by (11). Hence, βz,κ(x) 6= (0, 0) for all x ∈ X. Let X1 = {x ∈ X : βz,κq (x) > 0} and
let X2 = {x ∈ X : βz,κr (x) > 0}. Then, X1 ∩X2 = ∅ and X = X1 ∪X2.
The first step is to define the function to which we apply the Implicit Function Theo-
rem. Let q¯′ = q¯−2κq and let r¯′ = r¯−2κr. We use β to denote 〈(βq(x))x∈X1 , (βr(x))x∈X2〉,
the offers, and let λ = (, µ, φ) ∈ D ×∆(Z) be the parameter vector, where
D = {(, µ) ∈ [−1, 1]×∆(X) : µ(x) > 2 for all x ∈ X}.
(In what follows, M−1/2 is one possible magnitude of .) Let
Hx(bq, br; β, a) =
∑
z∈Z
φ(z)u (q, r;x, z) , (24)
where
q = q¯′ +
brq− − bqr−
r− + 2br
and r = r¯′ +
bqr− − brq−
q− + 2bq
,
and
(q−, r−) =

(
∑
x′∈X1 µ(x
′)βq(x′) + κq − 2βq(x),
∑
x′∈X2 µ(x
′)βr(x′) + κr) if x ∈ X1
(
∑
x′∈X1 µ(x
′)βq(x′) + κq,
∑
x′∈X2 µ(x
′)βr(x′) + κr − 2βr(x)) if x ∈ X2
.
When 2 = M−1, Hx is the stage-2 objective function of an agent expressed in terms of
average offers of others, (q−, r−). Also, because (, µ) ∈ D, (q−, r−) > 0.
Now, let
Gx(β, a) =

argmaxbq≥0Hx(bq, 0; β, a) if x ∈ X1
argmaxbr≥0Hx(0, br; β, a) if x ∈ X2
.
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Because each branch of Hx is strictly concave and, hence, has a unique maximum, Gx is
a well-defined function. Moreover, by the Theorem of the Maximum, Gx is continuous
in all its arguments. Letting G = (Gx)x∈X , the function to which we apply the implicit
function theorem is G(β, a)− β, whose range is in RX .
Before doing that, there are several facts about G that we will use. First, let λ0 =
(0, µz, δz) and let
p(β) =
∑
y∈X2 µz(y)βr(y) + κr∑
x∈X1 µz(x)βq(x) + κq
. (25)
Then, for all x ∈ X1,
Gx(β, λ0) = max{q¯′ − qzx(p(β)), 0}, (26)
and for all y ∈ X2,
Gy(β, λ0) = max{p(β)[qzy(p(β))− q¯′], 0}, (27)
where qzx(p) is the demand function of good q for type-x under known state z. Because β
z,κ
is a CE in Lz(κ), it follows that G(βz,κ, λ0) = βz,κ. Notice that the first two components
of λ0 lie in the interior of D because µz(x) > 0 for all x ∈ X and for all z ∈ Z. Second,
there is an open neighborhood of (βz,κ, λ0) such that G is continuously differentiable in
that neighborhood and has a positive offer of q for all x ∈ X1 and has a positive offer
of r for x ∈ X2. The proof of this claim follows from the fact that each branch of Hx
is strictly concave and continuously differentiable near (βz,κ, λ0), so that the Implicit
Function Theorem can be applied to the first-order conditions that characterize G in
that neighborhood. This is where the assumption that all types trade in Lz is used.
Third, if σ : X → {0, ...,M} is a type-configuration of M agents and if β ∈ OX satisfies
G(β, 1/
√
M,σ/M, φ) = β with βq(x) > 0 for all x ∈ X1 and βr(x) > 0 for all x ∈ X2,
then β is a symmetric equilibrium in E(M,σ/M, φσ, κ). This follows because Hx defined
by (24) is the same as that defined by (20) in the proof of Lemma 2 if 2 = 1/M and
µ = σ/M and because the strict concavity of each branch of Hx implies that the sign
restriction in each branch in (24) is not binding if the maximum is attained at positive
offers.
The last preliminary step is to set out the partial derivatives of G w.r.t. to β evaluated
at (β, λ) = (βz,κ, λ0). Notice that, by (11), p(βz,κ) = pz,κ. Using equations (25)-(26), we
compute the derivatives according to the chain rule and obtain
∂Gx′(β
z,κ, λ0)
∂βq(x)
=

− ∂
∂βq(x)
p(βz,κ) d
dp
qzx′(p
z,κ) for (x, x′) ∈ X1 ×X1
∂
∂βq(x)
p(βz,κ)
[
pz,κ d
dp
qzx′(p
z,κ) + (qzx′(p
z,κ)− q¯′)
]
for (x, x′) ∈ X1 ×X2
and
∂Gx′(β
∗, λ0)
∂βr(x)
=

∂
∂βr(x)
p(βz,κ)
[
pz,κ d
dp
qzx′(p
z,κ) + (qzx′(p
∗)− q¯′)
]
for (x, x′) ∈ X2 ×X2
− ∂
∂βq(x)
p(βz,κ) d
dp
qzx′(p
z,κ) for (x, x′) ∈ X2 ×X1
.
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Now, let |X| = L. Then
[
∂G(βz,κ,λ0)
∂β(x)
]
x∈X
= a′LkL with
aL = [(
d
dp
qzx(p
z,κ))x∈X1 , (
d
dp
qzx′(p
z,κ) + (qzx′(p
z,κ)− q¯′))x′∈X2 ]
and
kL = [(− ∂
∂βq(x)
p(βz,κ))x∈X1 , (
∂
∂βr(x′)
p(βz,κ))x′∈X2 ].
Thus, by Claim 1,
∣∣∣[∂G(βz,κ,λ0)∂β(x) ]
x∈X
− IL
∣∣∣ = (−1)L+1C, where
C =
∑
x∈X1
(−∂p(β
z,κ)
∂βq(x)
)
dqzx(p
z,κ)
dp
+
∑
y∈X2
∂p(βz,κ)
∂βr(y)
[
pz,κ
d
dp
qzx(p
z,κ) + (qzy(p
z,κ)− q¯′)
]
− 1
=
pz,κ∑
x∈X1 µz(x)β
z,κ
q (x) + κq
∑
x∈X1
µz(x)
dqzx(p
z,κ)
dp
+
(pz,κ)2∑
y∈X2 µz(y)β
z,κ
r (y) + κr
∑
y∈X2
µz(y)
dqzy(p
z,κ)
dp
+
pz,κ∑
y∈X2 µz(y)βr(y) + κr
∑
y∈X2
µz(y)[q
z
y(p
z,κ)− q¯′]− 1
=
[
(pz,κ)2∑
y∈X2 µz(y)β
z,κ
r (y) + κr
∑
x∈X
µz(x)
dqzx(p
z,κ)
dp
]
+
[ ∑
y∈X2 µz(y)βr(y)∑
y∈X2 µz(y)βr(y) + κr
− 1
]
=
(pz,κ)2∑
y∈X2 µz(y)β
,zκ
r (y) + κr
[∑
x∈X
µz(x)
dqzx(p
z,κ)
dp
+
−κr
(pz,κ)2
]
.
The last expression differs from zero because the CE corresponding to βz,κ is regular.
Therefore, by the implicit function theorem, there is a neighborhood Ψz ⊂ D×∆(Z)
around λ0 and a continuously differentiable function gz : Ψz → ([0, q¯′]X1 × [0, r¯′]X2) such
that gz(λ0) = βz,κ, and G(gz(λ), λ) = gz(λ) for all λ ∈ Ψz. Because βz,κq (x) > 0 for
all x ∈ X1 and βz,κr (y) > 0 for all y ∈ X2 and because gz is continuous, there exists
an open neighborhood Λz ⊂ Ψz containing λ0 such that for all λ ∈ Λz, gz(λ) is strictly
positive in all its coordinates. Thus, if (1/
√
M,σ/M, φσ) ∈ Λz for a type-configuration σ :
{0, ...,M} → O, then gz(1/
√
M,σ/M, φσ) is a symmetric equilibrium for E(M,σ/M, φσ).
Finally, let fz(, µ, φ) = gz(
√
, µ, φ).
Proposition 1. Fix an ex post regular CE profile {(qz,κ, rz,κ)}z∈Z in which every type
trades. Then there exists a number N¯ and a sequence of fully-revealing equilibria {sN =
(sN1 , s
N
2 , s
N
3 )}∞N=N¯ such that
lim
N→∞
cs
N
1,x = (q
z,κ
x , r
z,κ
x ) for all x ∈ X (28)
almost surely conditional on z for each z ∈ Z.
Proof. We show that for large N ’s, ((s∗0, s
∗
1, s
∗
2), ϕ
∗) is a PBE, where s∗2 is given by
(12)-(13), and ϕ∗ is given by (9)-(10). Notice that both s∗2 and ϕ
∗ depend on N but not
on s∗1. By construction and Lemma 3, s
∗
2 is a best response against s
∗
2 w.r.t. ϕ
∗ and ϕ∗
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is consistent with Bayes’ rule. It remains to show that s∗1 and s
∗
2 is a best response to
(s∗1, s
∗
2, s
∗
3) for sufficiently large N .
We begin with optimality of s∗2. Let q¯
′ = q¯ − 2κq and let r¯′ = r¯ − 2κr. Given
s∗1, M
N = d(1 − η)Ne is the number of active agents and consider an agent of type x.
Because the assignment into active/inactive categories is drawn independently from the
types, conditional on being active, the agent’s belief about other agents’ types is such that
those types are i.i.d. with marginal probabilities (µz(x))x∈X conditional on each state z.
Let γNz be the i.i.d. distribution over X
MN−1 generated by (µz(x))x∈X . Given s∗3, the
stage-2 problem for the agent of type x is maxa∈OGNx (a), where
GNx (a) = ηGx(a) + (1− η)FNx (a). (29)
Here, FNx (a) is the expected payoff contingent on being active and playing offer a at
stage-2, and Gx(a) is the stage-2 payoff of playing a contingent on being inactive; namely,
Gx(a) =
∑
z∈Z
τx(z)u(q¯
′ − aq + ar/p, r¯′ − ar + paq;x, z), (30)
where p = r/q.
Claim 1. Let q1(a;x) be the consumption of q of a type-x agent who plays a and becomes
inactive. There exists  > 0 such that if q1(a;x) /∈ I(x), then Gx(a) < Gx(s∗1(x))− .
Proof. It is easy to verify that maxa∈OGx(a) is equivalent to maxq∈[0,2q¯] Lx(q), where
Lx(q) =
∑
z∈Z
τx(z)u(q, pq¯
′ + r¯′ − pq;x, z).
Let 2δx = miny∈X, y 6=x |q(x, κ)− q(y, κ)|. Then, q /∈ I(x) implies |q − q(x, κ)| ≥ δx. Be-
cause Lx(q) is strictly concave in q and has a maximum at q(x, κ), it follows that Ax =
min{−L′x(q(x, κ)+ δx2 ), L′x(q(x, κ)− δx2 )} > 0. Then, for any q such that |q− q(x, κ)| ≥ δx2 ,
Lx(q) ≤ Lx(q(x, κ)) − δx2 Ax. Take x = (δx/4)Ax. Then, q1(a;x) /∈ I(x) implies Gx(a) =
Lx(q1(a;x)) ≤ Lx(q(x, κ))− 2x < Gx(s∗1(x))− x. Finally, let  = min{x}x∈X .2
Claim 2. For all a ∈ O,
lim
N→∞
FNx (a) =
∑
z∈Z
τx(z)u(q
z,κ
x , r
z,κ
x ;x, z), (31)
uniformly over O. (Recall that (qz,κx , rz,κx )x∈X is the regular CE allocation of Lz(κ) that
was used to construct the strategy profiles βσ in (12)).
Proof. First we give an explicit expression for FNx (a). For each a ∈ I(x¯),
FNx (a) =
∑
z∈Z
τx(z)
 ∑
ξ∈XMN−1
γNz (ξ)
[
u(qN(a; z, ξ), rN(a; z, ξ);x, z)
] , (32)
where ξ = (ξ1, ..., ξMN−1) ∈ XMN−1 is the vector of types of the other active agents. Here,
qN(a; z, ξ) = q¯′ +
s∗3,r(x, a, ν
ξ,−a)QN− − s∗3,q(x, a, νξ,−a)RN−
s∗3,r(x, a, νξ,−a) +R
N−
,
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and
rN(a; z, ξ) = r¯′ +
s∗3,q(x, a, ν
ξ,−a)RN− − s∗3,r(x, a, νξ,−a)QN−
s∗3,q(x, a, νξ,−a) +Q
N−
,
where νξ,−a is the announced histogram given that other active agents’ types are ξ and
that other agents follow s∗2. Also, Q
N
− and R
N
− are the implied stage-3 offers of other active
agents according to the candidate equilibrium. That is, letting 1y(y) = 1 and 1y(x) = 0
if x 6= y,
νξ,−a(s∗2(y)) =
MN−1∑
i=1
1y(ξi) for each y ∈ X and νξ,−a(a′) = 0 otherwise, (33)
and
(QN− , R
N
− ) =
∑
y∈X
σξ(y)(βσ
ξ
(y) + κ)− βσξ(x¯), (34)
where σξ is the type-configuration believed by other active agents. Recall that for a ∈
I(x¯)),
σξ(y) =
MN−1∑
i=1
1y(ξi) for each y 6= x¯ and σξ(x¯) =
MN−1∑
i=1
1x¯(ξi) + 1. (35)
We prove the claim by showing that, for any infinite sequence of X-valued random
variables that is i.i.d. w.r.t. the marginal distribution (µz(x))x∈X , ξ = (ξ1, ..., ξn, ...), in
which ξM
N−1 = (ξ1, ..., ξMN−1) describes the types of the other active agents when there
are MN of them, we have
lim
N→∞
qN(a; z, ξM
N−1) = qz,κx , lim
N→∞
rN(a; z, ξM
N−1) = rz,κx , (36)
almost surely conditional on the state z. Because u is continuous, the claim follows
immediately from (32) and (36).
By our construction of off-equilibrium beliefs, (9) and (10), FNx (a) depends only on
the interval I(x) for which a ∈ I(x). Because the number of intervals is finite, uniformity
follows from convergence; namely, (31).
By definition, ξM
N−1 = (ξ1, ..., ξMN−1) is distributed according to γNz . For each N , let
σN = σξ
MN−1
as defined in (35) (recall that a ∈ I(x)) and let νN = νξMN−1,−a, as defined in
(33). That is, σN is the type-configuration believed by all other agents. Then, the sequence
{σN} is such that ∑y∈X σN(y) = MN and for each y ∈ X, limN→∞(σN(y)/MN) = µz(y)
almost surely. Consider a realization of ξ for which limN→∞(σN(y)/MN) = µz(y). Then,
for N sufficiently large, (1/MN , σN/MN , φσ
N
) ∈ Az and hence, for such N ’s, βσN =
fz(1/M
N , σN/MN , φσ
N
). Notice that limN→∞ φσ
N
= δz. Thus, by Lemma 3 (ii), we
have limN→∞ βσ
N
= βz,κ (the offers corresponding to the CE 〈pz,κ, (qz,κx , rz,κx )x∈X〉). This
implies that
lim
N→∞
(
QN−
MN
,
RN−
MN
) =
∑
y∈X
µz(y)(β
z(y) + κ) and lim
N→∞
RN−
QN−
= pz,κ, (37)
26
where QN− and R
N
− are defined in (34) with ξ = ξ
MN−1.
Finally, we show that limN→∞ s∗3(x, a, ν
N) = βz,κ(x), where s∗3 is defined in (13).
Letting φN = margZϕ
∗(x, a, νN), where ϕ∗ is defined in (9) and (10), we have
lim
N→∞
φN [z] = 1.
Notice that φN is derived from the type-configuration believed by the agent, which is
different from σN if x 6= x¯. For each N , s∗3(x, a, νN) solves
max
b∈O
HNx (b) = max
b∈O
∑
z′∈Z
φN [z′]u
(
q¯′ +
brQ
N
− − bqRN−
RN− + br
, r¯′ +
bqR
N
− − brQN−
QN− + bq
;x, z′
)
. (38)
Now, let
Jx(b; p, c1, c2, φ) =
∑
z′∈Z
φ[z′]u (q, r;x, z′)
with q = q¯′+ br
p(1+c2br)
− bq
1+c2br
and r = r¯′− br
1+c1bq
+ pbq
1+c1bq
, and where the domain for Jx is
O×
[
κr
q¯′+κq ,
r¯′+κr
κq
]
×
[
0, 1
κr
]
×
[
0, 1
κq
]
×∆(Z). It follows that Jx(b; R
N
−
QN−
, 1/QN− , 1/R
N
− , φ
N) =
HNx (b). Therefore, by the argument used in the proof of Lemma 3 (i), Jx(·; p, c1, c2, φ)
has a unique maximum, jx(p, c1, c2, φ). And because Jx is continuous on its domain, the
Maximum Theorem implies that jx(p, c1, c2, φ) is continuous.
Now, for each N , s∗3(x, a, ν
N) = jx(
RN−
QN−
, 1/QN− , 1/R
N
− , φ
N). By (37) and the continuity
of jx, it follows that
b∗ = lim
N→∞
s∗3(x, a, ν
N) = lim
N→∞
jx
(
RN−
QN−
, 1/QN− , 1/R
N
− , φ
N
)
= jx(p
z,κ, 0, 0, δz).
By the definition of Jx, it follows that b∗ maximizes u
(
q¯′ − bq + brpz , r¯′ − br + pz,κbq;x, z
)
.
Therefore, b∗ is the offer for type-x agents corresponding to the CE, 〈pz,κ, (qz,κx , rz,κx )x∈X〉;
that is, b∗ = βz,κ(x). This shows that
lim
N→∞
qN(a; z, ξM
N−1) = q¯′+
βz,κr (x)
pz,κ
−βz,κq (x), lim
N→∞
rN(a; z, ξM
N−1) = r¯′+βz,κq (x)p
z,κ−βz,κr (x),
almost surely for all a ∈ O. This proves (36). 2
In order to have any effect on FNx (a), the agent must choose an offer sufficiently far
from s∗2, the offer that maximizes Gx(a). Claim 1 shows that the implied loss in terms of
Gx(a) is bounded away from zero (and does not depend on N). By Claim 2, any effect
on FNx (a) goes to zero as N → ∞. Together, they imply that s∗2 is a best response to
(s∗1, s
∗
2, s
∗
3) for sufficiently large N .
Finally, we need to show that s∗1 is a best response to (s
∗
1, s
∗
2, s
∗
3); that is, that each
agent is willing to participate given that all agents participate and their behavior follows
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(s∗2, s
∗
3) in stages two and three. By Lemma 0 (and small κ), the CE (q
z,κ, rz,κ) for each
z ∈ Z is such that for all x ∈ X and z ∈ Z, u(qz,κx , rz,κx ;x, z) > u(q, r;x, z). Therefore,
∆0 =
∑
z∈Z,x∈X
τ0(z)µz(x)[u(q
z,κ
x , r
z,κ
x , x, z)− u(q, r, x, z)] > 0.
For each z, let Ez[u(qNx , rNx , x, z)] be the expected payoff for an agent of type x, con-
ditional on state z and being active, given that all agents participate and their behavior
follows (s∗2, s
∗
3) in stages two and three. Now, by (36), there exists N such that if N ≥ N ,
then ∣∣∣∣∣ ∑
z∈Z,x∈X
τ0(z)µz(x){Ez[u(qNx , rNx ;x, z)]− u(qz,κx , rz,,κx ;x, z)}
∣∣∣∣∣ < ∆0/2. (39)
By following the equilibrium strategy, an agent’s ex ante expected payoff (before type
is realized) is given by∑
z∈Z,x∈X
τ0(z)µz(x){ηu(q̂(x, κ), r̂(x, κ);x, z) + (1− η)Ez[u(qNx , rNx ;x, z)]},
and his payoff by not participating is given by
∑
z∈Z,x∈X τ0(z)µz(x)u(q, r;x, z) ≡ A. Thus,
the agent is willing to participate if∑
z∈Z,x∈X
τ0(z)µz(x)u(q̂(x, κ), r̂(x, κ);x, z) > A (40)
and ∑
z∈Z,x∈X
τ0(z)µz(x)Ez[u(qNx , rNx ;x, z)] > A. (41)
Now, by A1 (and small κ),
∑
z∈Z τx(z)u(q̂(x, κ), r̂(x, κ);x, z) >
∑
z∈Z τx(z)u(q, r;x, z) for
some x. Hence, ∑
x∈X
[∑
z′∈Z
τ0(z
′)µz′(x)
]∑
z∈Z
τx(z)u(q(x, κ); r(x, κ), x, z)
>
∑
x∈X
[∑
z′∈Z
τ0(z
′)µz′(x)
]∑
z∈Z
τx(z)u(q, r;x, z).
Because τx(z) = τ0(z)µz(x)/
[∑
z′∈Z τ0(z
′)µz′(x)
]
, this implies (40).
Moreover, N ≥ N implies∑
z∈Z,x∈X
τ0(z)µz(x)Ez[u(qNx , rNx ;x, z)]−
∑
z∈Z,x∈X
τ0(z)µz(x)u(q, r;x, z)
=
∑
z∈Z,x∈X
τ0(z)µz(x){Ez[u(qNx , rNx ;x, z)]− u(qz,κx , rz,κx ;x, z)}
+
∑
z∈Z,x∈X
τ0(z)µz(x)[u(q
z,κ
x , r
z,κ
x ;x, z)− u(q, r;x, z)]
> ∆0 −∆0/2 > 0,
where the inequality, which implies (41), follows from (39).
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8.3 Almost ex post efficiency
Proposition 2. Let ε > 0 be given. There exists κ¯ and N(κ, η) such that if (κ, η) satisfies
κ¯ > κ ≥ 4η(q¯, r¯) > 0 (42)
and N > N(κ, η), then there exists a fully revealing equilibrium whose outcome is ex post
ε-efficient.
Proof. Let (qz,κ, rz,κ) be a competitive allocation in the economy Lz(κ) which is regular
and in which every type trades. Consider another economy J z(ρ, κ), where ρ ∈ ∆(X) is
the proportion of agents according to type, and each agent has endowment (q¯+κq, r¯+κr).
Let (qz,ρ,κ, rz,ρ,κ) denote the competitive allocation for J z(ρ, κ) under known state-of-
the-world z. We omit the proof of the following claim, which only asserts continuity
of competitive allocations w.r.t. endowment parameters and the proportion of different
types.
Claim 1. Let (qz, rz) be a regular competitive allocation in Lz, and, let (qz,κ, rz,κ) be the
competitive allocation in Lz(κ) that is close to (qz, rz). Then, for any  > 0, there exists
δ1() > 0 such that if |ρ(x) − µz(x)| < δ1() for each x ∈ X and if max{κq, κr} < δ1(),
then there is a competitive allocation (qz,ρ,κ, rz,ρ,κ) in J z(ρ;κ) for which
|u(qz,κx , rz,κx ;x, z)− u(qz,ρ,κx , rz,ρ,κx ;x, z)| < .
for all x ∈ X.
The next claim constructs the high probability event Ez,ωN () that we need to establish
ε ex post optimality of a Proposition-1 equilibrium. The event Ez,ωN will be the inter-
section of two events, E1z,ωN and E
2
z,ωN , where the first involves only exogenous random
variables and the second depends on a selected equilibrium.
Fix some (κ, η) > 0 (recall that η is the probability of being inactive) such that Lz(κ),
for each z ∈ Z, has a regular competitive equilibrium allocation, denoted (qz,κ, rz,κ), in
which every type trades that is close to the regular competitive allocation in Lz, (qz, rz).
For any realization ζN and ωN , there is a unique corresponding type-configuration for
active agents, denoted σ(ζN , ωN) = (σ(ζN , ωN)(x) : x ∈ X). For each (z, ωN) ∈ Z ×
N
and for any  > 0, define the event E1z,ωN () as
E1z,ωN () =
{
ζN : (∀x) ∣∣σ(ζN , ωN)(x)/MN − µz(x)∣∣ < δ1()} , (43)
where δ1() is defined in Claim 1 above (uniformly across all z’s). By Proposition 1,
for κ small and for η satisfies (42), there exists N¯(κ, η) such that if N > N¯(κ, η), then
there exists a fully revealing equilibrium (sN1 , s
N
2 , s
N
3 ) (corresponding to the competitive
allocations {(qz,κ, rz,κ) : z ∈ Z}). As above, we use βσ to denote the stage-3 offers along
the corresponding equilibrium path for a realization of type-configuration σ for active
agents; we also use (qσ(x), rσ(x)) to denote the corresponding payoffs as determined in
(4) from offers βσ. Then, let
E2z,ωN () =
{
ζN : (∀x)
∣∣∣u(qσ(ζN ,ωN )(x), rσ(ζN ,ωN )(x);x, z)− u(qz,κx , rz,κx ;x, z)∣∣∣ < } . (44)
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Claim 2. Let Ez,ωN () = E1z,ωN () ∩ E2z,ωN (). There exists N2(κ, η, ) such that if
N > N2(κ, η, ), then for any (z, ωN) ∈ Z × ΩN , P [Ez,ωN () | ωN , z] > 1− .
Proof. Let ξ be an infinite sequence of i.i.d. X-valued random variables with marginal
distribution given by µz. Because ωN is independent of the realization of types and the
state-of-the-world, for any N the sequence {ζn : 1 ≤ n ≤ N, ωn = 1} and the sequence
{ξm : m = 1, ...,MN} have the same distribution conditional on z and ωN . For each N
and ξM
N
= (ξ1, ..., ξMN ), let βσ
N
describe the equilibrium stage-3 offers under (sN1 , s
N
2 , s
N
3 )
along the equilibrium path with σN(x) = #{1 ≤ m ≤ MN : ξm = x} and let (qσN , rσN )
describe the corresponding equilibrium payoffs for active agents. By the law of large
numbers, for any z and x ∈ X,
lim
N→∞
σN(x)/MN = µz(x)
almost surely conditional on z. Thus, by Proposition 1, it follows that limN→∞ βσ
N
= βz
almost surely conditional on z. Hence, by continuity of u, for any z,
lim
N→∞
u
(
qσ
N
(x), rσ
N
(x);x, z
)
= u(qz,κx , r
z,κ
x ;x, z) for all x,
almost surely conditional on z.
Now we can complete the proof. Given ε, let κ¯ = δ1( ε
3
) and consider our mechanism
with max{κq, κr} < κ¯ and with η ≤ min{κq4q¯ , κr4r¯ }. Let (q¯′, r′) = (q¯ − 2κq, r − 2κr).
Given the fully revealing equilibrium (sN1 , s
N
2 , s
N
3 ) constructed above for N > N¯(κ, η)
agents, and given a type realization, ζN = (ζ1, ..., ζN) ∈ XN , and an activeness-status
realization, ωN = (ω1, ..., ωN), the corresponding allocation is as follows: if ωn = 0, then
cs
N
n (ζ
N , ωN , z) = (q̂(x, κ), r̂(x, κ)) ;
if ωn = 1, then
cs
N
n (ζ
N , ωN , z) = (qσ(ζ
N ,ωN )(ζn, κ), r
σ(ζN ,ωN )(ζn, κ)).
Let N(κ, η) = N2(κ, η, ε
3
). Now we show that if max{κq, κr} < κ¯ and η ≤ min{κq4q¯ , κr4r¯ },
and if N > N(κ, η), then the allocation {csNn : n ∈ N} is ex post ε-efficient. For any
realization ζN = (ζ1, ..., ζN) ∈ XN and ωN = (ω1, ..., ωN), let M(ζN , ωN) = {m ∈ N :
ωm = 1}. By Lemma 1 and η ≤ min{κq4q¯ , κr4r¯ }, we know that the allocation cs
N
is feasible.
For each z and for each ωN , by Claim 2, N > N2(κ, η, ε
3
) implies P[Ez,ωN (ε/3)|z, ωN ] >
1− ε. Thus, to show that csN is ex post ε-efficient, suppose, by way of contradiction, that
c′ is feasible and (15) holds for some z, ωN and for some ζN ∈ Ez,ωN (ε/3). Fix such a
(z, ωN , ζN) and let c′n = (q
′
n, r
′
n) for each n ∈ N .
Let ρ(x) = σ(ζN , ωN)(x)/MN . Then, let (qz,ρ,κ, rz,ρ,κ) be the competitive allocation
for a finite economy which has σ(ζN , ωN)(x) agents of type-x for each x and in which each
agent has endowment (q¯ + κq, r¯ + κr). Now, consider the following allocation {(q′′n, r′′n) :
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n ∈ N}, using (qz,ρ,κ, rz,ρ,κ) as constructed in Claim 1, defined as (q′′n, r′′n) = (qz,ρ,κx , rz,ρ,κx )
if ωn = 1 and ζn = x; and (q′′n, r
′′
n) = (0, 0) if ωn = 0. Because ζ
N ∈ E1z,ωN (ε/3) and
max{κq, κr} < δ1(ε/3), it follows from Claim 1 that
|u(qz,κx , rz,κx ;x, z)− u(qz,ρ,κx , rz,ρ,κx ;x, z)| < ε/3.
Moreover, because ζN ∈ E2z,ωN (ε/3), we have∣∣∣u(qσ(ζN ,ωN )(x), rσ(ζN ,ωN )(x);x, z)− u(qz,κx , rz,κx ;x, z)∣∣∣ < ε/3.
Thus,
u(qz,ρ,κx , r
z,ρ,κ
x ;x, z) < u(q
σ(ζN ,ωN )(x), rσ(ζ
N ,ωN )(x);x, z) + 2ε/3.
Now, for each n such that ωn = 1 and ζn = x,
u(q′′n, r
′′
n;x, z) < u(c
sN
n (ζ
N , ωN , z);x, z) + 2ε/3 < u(q′n, r
′
n;x, z)− ε/3; (45)
while for each n such that ωn = 0 and ζn = x,
u(q′′n, r
′′
n;x, z) = u(0, 0;x, z) ≤ u(cs
N
n (ζ
N , ωN , z);x, z) < u(q′n, r
′
n;x, z)− ε, (46)
where the second inequality in each of (45) and (46) follows from (15), the contradicting
assumption. Therefore, {(q′n, r′n) : n ∈ N} Pareto dominates {(q′′n, r′′n) : n ∈ N}.
Now, notice that∑
n∈N
(q′′n, r
′′
n) ≥ (1− η)N(q + κq, r + κr) ≥ N(q, r)
since η ≤ min{κq
4q¯
, κr
4r¯
}. Thus, {(q′′n, r′′n) : n ∈ N} is a competitive allocation (with inactive
agents having zero endowments) for an economy with total resources no less than that for
the allocation {(q′n, r′n) : n ∈ N}. By the first fundamental theorem of welfare economics,
it follows that {(q′′n, r′′n) : n ∈ N} cannot be Pareto dominated by {(q′n, r′n) : n ∈ N}. 
8.4 Uniqueness of equilibrium
Proposition 3. Assume U1-U3. Suppose that the competitive demand for good-q
is monotone in Lz for each z ∈ Z. Then for some κ¯ > 0, if κ ∈ (0, κ¯] and η ≤
min{κq/2q¯, κr/2r¯}, then there exists N¯ such that for all N > N¯ , any symmetric PBE
in pure strategies sN = (sN1 , s
N
2 , s
N
3 ) with s
N
1 = yes is fully revealing.
Proof. First, by A2 and Lemma 0, we have uniqueness of CE in Lz(κ). Let q¯′ = q¯− 2κq
and let r¯′ = r¯− 2κr. (Excess demand for good-q in Lz(κ) is f(p;κ) =
∑
x∈X µz(x)qx(p) +
κr/p− q¯′−κq. Therefore, ∂f(p;κ)/∂p =
∑
x∈X µz(x) [∂qx(p)/∂p]−κr/p2. Monotonicity of
demand functions implies that the first term is negative. Hence, ∂f(p;κ)/∂p < 0, which
rules out multiple CE’s.) Now, fix some κ > 0. For each z ∈ Z, let βz,κ be the offer
corresponding to the unique CE in Lz(κ).
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First we exclude complete pooling; i.e., an equilibrium s with full participation such
that for some a¯ ∈ O, s1(x) = a¯ for all x ∈ X. We use α(x, κ) to denote the stage-1 offer
that corresponds to stage-1 consumption q̂(x, κ) for all x.
Claim 0. For any equilibrium s with s1 = yes, there exist x 6= y ∈ X such that
s2(x) 6= s2(y).
Proof. By way of contradiction, suppose that s is an equilibrium with s1 = yes and with
s2(x) = a¯ for all x ∈ X. By U2, this implies that the realized payoff of all active agents
is (q¯′, r¯′), no-trade. However, by A1, there exists some x such that Gx(a¯) < Gx(α(x, κ)).
(See (30) for the definition of Gx(a).) Therefore, this agent has a profitable deviation to
α(x, κ) because no-trade is feasible at stage-3 contingent on being active. 2
Claim 0 implies that any candidate equilibrium with full participation that is not
fully revealing is associated with a partition Y = (Y1, ..., YK) of X with 1 < K < |X|.
We denote such a candidate equilibrium for N agents by sN . We prove, by way of
contradiction, that sN cannot be an equilibrium for sufficiently large N . The contradiction
is that one agent, called the potential defector, has a profitable deviation (to the stage-2
action described by α).
For a potential defector of type-x, the stage-2 objective function is
GNx (a) = ηGx(a) + (1− η)FNx (a),
where FNx (a) is the expected payoff implied by offer a at stage-2 conditional on being
active. We show that for any  > 0, FNx (a) does not vary with a by more than  for
sufficiently large N . By assumption U3, FNx (a) depends on the associated set of types,
A ⊆ X, that is believed by other active agents when a is offered at stage-2. Indeed, this
holds for equilibrium beliefs as well: if a is an equilibrium offer with a = sN2 (y), then
a is associated with A = Yk with y ∈ Yk. Therefore, we may rewrite FNx (a) as FNx (A)
with A ⊆ X being the set of types associated with a. To calculate FNx (A), we need to
characterize the stage-3 offers following a public announcement νN such that νN(a˜) = 1
for some a˜ that is associated with A and νN(a) = 0 if a /∈ {sN2 (Yk) : k = 1, ..., K} ∪ {a˜}.
We divide the rest of the proof into four claims and a final argument. Each of the
first three claims has two similar parts—one part for the potential defector and the other
for agents following equilibrium behavior. Claim 1 is concerned with beliefs along the
equilibrium path and has nothing to do with behavior. Claim 2 provides bounds on offers
that assure that consumption of each good is bounded away from zero—bounds that hold
in any equilibrium. Those bounds imply bounds on the derivatives that appear in the first-
order conditions that hold at all best responses. Claim 3 establishes uniform convergence
of equilibrium offers, βN , to “price-taking” offers with a known state-of-the-world and
with a price that is given by the equilibrium offers of others, where the uniformity is over
all possible sequences of equilibria. Claim 4 is closely related to Claim 2 in the proof of
Theorem 1 because it says that FNx (a) does not vary much with a for sufficiently large
N . The final argument follows the logic of the proof of Proposition 1. In what follows,
let MN = d(1− η)Ne be the number of active agents.
Claim 1. Let νN be the public announcement which includes the offer a˜N (made by the
potential defector), and let λN be the corresponding signal configuration for agents other
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than the potential defector.
(a) Denote the stage-3 belief of the potential defector of type x, following λN , by
ϕN(x, a˜, ν−a˜N )[z, ξ
1, ..., ξK ] = φ˜Nx [z]γ˜
N
z [ξ
1, ξ2, ..., ξK ],
where φ˜Nx [z] is the posterior over states, γ˜
N
z is that over the types of other active agents
conditional on z, and ξk = (ξk1 , ..., ξ
k
λN (Yk)
) ∈ Y λN (Yk)k describes the types for those agents
who made the offer associated with Yk. Then, for any  > 0, there exist N1a () and
δ1a() ≤  such that if N > N1a () and if
∣∣∣λN (Yk)MN − µz∗(Yk)∣∣∣ < δ1a() for all k, then for each
y ∈ X,
φ˜Nx [z
∗] > 1−  and γ˜Nz∗
[∣∣∣∣ρ˜N(y)− µz∗(y)µz∗(Yk)
∣∣∣∣ < ] > 1− ,
where
ρ˜N(y) = #{ξki : ξki = y, i = 1, ..., λN(Yk)}/λN(Yk),
the fraction of agents other than the potential defector with types in Yk who are of type-y.
(b) Consider an agent of type x other than the potential defector. For such an agent
the relevant signal configuration is the offer a˜N (made by the potential defector) and λN−
defined as follows: If x ∈ Yk¯, then λN− (Yk) = λN(Yk) for each k 6= k¯ and λN− (Yk¯) = λN(Yk¯)−
1. We denote such an agent’s stage-3 belief, after observing the signal configuration λN−
and a˜N , by
ϕN(y, s1(y), ν
−s1(y)
N )[z, ξ
1, ..., ξK , ξ˜] = φˆNy [z]γˆ
N
z [ξ
1, ..., ξK , ξ˜],
where φˆNx is the posterior distribution over states, γˆ
N
z is that over types of the other active
agents conditional on z. Then, for any  > 0, there exist N1b () and δ
1
b () ≤  such that if
N > N1b () and if
∣∣∣λN (Yk)MN − µz∗(Yk)∣∣∣ < δ1b () for all k, then for each y ∈ X,
φˆNx [z
∗] > 1−  and γˆNz∗
[∣∣∣∣ρˆN(y)− µz∗(y)µz∗(Yk)
∣∣∣∣ < ] > 1− ,
where
ρˆN(y) = #{ξki : ξki = y, i = 1, ..., λN− (Yk)}/λN− (Yk),
the fraction of other active (non-defecting) agents with types in Yk who are of type-y.
Proof. By Bayes’ rule, we can derive φˆNx , γˆ
N
z , φ˜
N
x , and γ˜
N
z as follows:
φˆNx [z¯] =
pi(z¯)µz¯(x)µz¯(A)
∏K
k=1[µz¯(Yk)]
λN− (Yk)∑
z∈Z pi(z)µz(x)µz(A)
∏K
k=1[µz(Yk)]
λN− (Yk)
,
(recall that A is associated with the offer a˜N) and
γˆNz [ξ
1, ..., ξK , ξ˜] =
µz(ξ˜)
µz(A)
K∏
k=1
λN− (Yk)∏
i=1
(
µz(ξ
k
i )
µz(Yk)
) ,
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where ξk = (ξk1 , ..., ξ
k
λN (Yk)
) ∈ Y λN (Yk)k describes the types for those who make the offer
associated with Yk and ξ˜ describes the type of the agent who offered a˜N .
Similarly,
φ˜Nx [z¯] =
pi(z¯)µz¯(x)
∏K
k=1[µz¯(Yk)]
λN (Yk)∑
z∈Z pi(z)µz(x)
∏K
k=1[µz(Yk)]
λN (Yk)
, γ˜Nz [ξ
1, ..., ξK ] =
K∏
k=1
λN (Yk)∏
i=1
µz(ξ
k
i )
µz(Yk)
,
where ξk = (ξk1 , ..., ξ
k
λN (Yk)
) ∈ Y λN (Yk)k describes the types for those agents other than the
potential defector who make the offer associated with Yk (λN(Yk) is the number of such
agents).
The convergence result for φˆNx and φ˜
N
x follows immediately from the above expressions.
We prove only Claim 1(b) for ρˆN . (The proof for 1(a) is similar.) For each z ∈ Z, consider
K infinite sequences of random variables (ζ1, ζ2, ..., ζK) such that ζki is Yk-valued for all
i ∈ N, the K sequences are independent of each other, and ζk is an i.i.d. sequence with
marginal distribution ( µz(y)
µz(Yk)
)y∈Yk . Let γz denote the joint distribution of (ζ
1, ζ2, ..., ζK).
Then, given a sequence of signal-configurations λN and a realization (ζ1, ζ2, ..., ζK), for
each k = 1, ..., K, each y ∈ Yk, and each N , define
ρN(y) = #{ζki : ζki = y, i = 1, ..., λN− (Yk)}/λN− (Yk).
Notice that for each y ∈ X, ρN(y) and ρˆN(y) have the same distribution. By the law of
large numbers, for each y ∈ Yk, ρN(y) converges to µz(y)/µz(Yk) in probability under γz
for any k as λN− (Yk) converges to infinity. This implies the result.2
Now we turn to equilibrium behavior, where, again, we distinguish between the poten-
tial defector and the other agents. We use β˜N,A(x) to denote the equilibrium offer from
the type-x potential defector and use βˆN,A(x) to denote the equilibrium offer from any
other type-x agent. Again, for notational ease, let q¯′ = q¯ − 2κq and let r¯′ = r¯ − 2κr.
Claim 2. There exist b¯ = (b¯q, b¯r) < (q¯′, r¯′) such that β˜N,A(x) ≤ b¯ and βˆN,A(x) ≤ b¯.
Proof. As might be expected, this follows from the Inada conditions and the bounds
on prices implied by κ > 0. First notice that β˜N,A(x) and βˆN,A(x) solve the following
problems.
Following a signal configuration λN for agents other than the potential defector, the
type-x potential defector has the stage-3 objective function,
H˜λ
N
x (bq, br) =
∑
z∈Z
φ˜Nx [z]Eγ˜Nz
[
u
(
q¯′ +
brQ˜
N
− − bqR˜N−
R˜N− + br
, r¯′ +
bqR˜
N
− − brQ˜N−
Q˜N− + bq
;x, z
)]
, (47)
where
(Q˜N− , R˜
N
− ) =
∑
k=1,..,K
∑
y∈Yk
λN(Yk)ρ˜
N(y)βˆN,A(y) +MNκ.
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Following a signal configuration λN− of other (non-defecting) agents, a type-x nondefector
has the stage-3 objective function,
Hˆλ
N
x (bq, br) =
∑
z∈Z
φˆNx [z]EγˆNz
[
u
(
q¯′ +
brQˆ
N
− − bqRˆN−
RˆN− + br
, r¯′ +
bqRˆ
N
− − brQˆN−
QˆN− + bq
;x, z
)]
, (48)
where
(QˆN− , Rˆ
N
− ) =
∑
k=1,..,K
∑
y∈Yk
λN− (Yk)ρˆ
N(y)βˆN,A(y) + β˜N,A(ξ˜) +MNκ,
and where ξ˜ denotes the potential defector’s type.
We prove the claim for β˜N,A; the other case is exactly the same. Obviously, we are only
concerned with positive offers. We spell out the details for β˜N,Aq (x) > 0. To abbreviate
notation, denote β˜N,Aq (x) by b
∗
q.
Being positive, b∗q satisfies the first-order condition (uq and ur denote the first-order
derivatives of u),
∑
z∈Z
φ˜Nx [z]
{
Eγ˜Nz
[
−uq(q(b∗q), r(b∗q);x, z) + ur(q(b∗q), r(b∗q);x, z)
Q˜N− R˜
N
−
(Q˜N− + bq)2
]}
= 0 (49)
where
(q(bq), r(bq)) =
(
q¯′ − bq, r¯′ + bqR˜
N
−
Q˜N− + bq
)
. (50)
For any bq ∈ [0, q¯′], Q˜N− ∈ [MNκq, (MN − 1)q¯′ +MNκq)], and R˜N− ∈ [MNκr, (MN −
1)r¯′ +MNκr)],
ur(q(bq), r(bq);x, z)
Q˜N− R˜
N
−
(Q˜N− + bq)2
≤ max
q∈[0,q¯],z∈Z
ur (q, r¯;x, z)
(q¯′ + κq)(r¯′ + κr)
κ2q
≡ A.
For each bq ∈ [0, q¯′), let
J(bq) = min
r∈[r¯,r¯+ q¯(r¯+κr)
κq
],z∈Z
uq(q¯
′ − bq, r;x, z).
Because [r¯′, r¯′+ q¯
′(r¯′+κr)
κq
] is compact andX and Z are both finite, J is well-defined, positive,
strictly increasing, limbq→q′ J(bq) =∞, and, of course, J(bq) ≤ uq(q(bq), r(bq);x, z).
Let γ > 1 be such that there is a solution for bq to J(bq) = γA. Denote the solution,
which is unique, b˜q(x). We next show that β˜N,Aq (x) = b
∗
q ≤ b˜q(x) < q¯′. The second
inequality follows from γA < ∞. Suppose the first inequality does not hold. Then, by
(49), for some (z, Q˜N− , R˜
N
− ), we must have
uq(q(b
∗
q), r(b
∗
q);x, z)− ur(q(b∗q), r(b∗q);x, z)
Q˜N− R˜
N
−
(Q˜N− + bq)2
≤ 0
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with (q(bq), r(bq)) as in (50). Because b∗q > b˜q(x),
uq(q(b
∗
q)), r(b
∗
q);x, z) > γA and ur(q(b
∗
q), r(b
∗
q);x, z)
Q˜N− R˜
N
−
(Q˜N− + bq)2
≤ γA,
a contradiction. The argument for β˜N,Ar (x) > 0 is exactly analogous.
Finally, take b¯q = max{b˜q(x), bˆq(x) : x ∈ X} and b¯r = max{b˜r(x), bˆr(x) : x ∈ X},
where bˆq(x) and bˆr(x) are the analogous bounds for βˆN,A(x). 2
Claim 3. Recall that β˜N,A denotes the equilibrium offer from the type-x potential defector
and βˆN,A denotes the equilibrium offer from other type-x agents. Fix a state z ∈ Z. For
any p > 0 let χ(x; p) = (χq(x; p), χr(x; p)) be the unique solution to
max
b∈O
Hx(b; p) = max
b∈O
u(q¯′ − bq + br
p
, r¯′ − br + bqp;x, z).
For any  > 0, there existsN3() and δ3() ≤  such that ifN > N3() and if
∣∣∣λN (Yk)MN − µz(Yk)∣∣∣ <
δ3() for all k, then for each x ∈ X,
|β˜N,Aq (x)− χq(x; pN)|+ |β˜N,Ar (x)− χr(x; pN)| < 
and
|βˆN,Aq (x)− χq(x; pN)|+ |βˆN,Ar (x)− χr(x; pN)| < ,
where
pN =
∑
y∈X µz(y)βˆ
N,A
r (y) + κr∑
y∈X µz(y)βˆ
N,A
q (y) + κq
.
Proof. We first prove the claim for β˜N,A. The objective H˜λ
N
x (b), defined in (47), for which
β˜N,A(x) is a best response, differs from Hx(b; pN), for which χ(x; pN) is a best response, in
two respects. In Hx(b; pN), offers of others are weighted by limit weights, while in H˜λ
N
x (b)
they are weighted by the agent’s posterior over the types of others. And, in Hx(b; pN),
the price is unaffected by the agent’s own offer, while in H˜λ
N
x (b) it responds to the agent’s
offer as in the market game. The proof of the claim shows that both differences disappear
for sufficiently large N .
Let d = 1
2
min{q¯′−b¯q, r¯′−b¯r}, where (b¯q, b¯r) is given by Claim 2. First we show that, for
any  > 0, there exist N2() and δ2() such that if N > N2() and if
∣∣∣λN (Yk)MN − µz(Yk)∣∣∣ <
δ2() for all k, then for all x ∈ X and for all bq ∈ [0, q¯′ − d] and all br ∈ [0, r¯′ − d],∣∣∣∣ ∂∂bqHx(bq, 0; pN)− ∂∂bq H˜λNx (bq, 0)
∣∣∣∣ <  and ∣∣∣∣ ∂∂brHx(0, br; pN)− ∂∂br H˜λNx (0, br)
∣∣∣∣ < .
(51)
Because the arguments are essentially the same, we only prove the first of these.
Fix some x ∈ X and let
Lz(bq, p1, p2) = uq(q¯
′ − bq, r¯′ + bqp1;x, z)− ur(q¯′ − bq, r¯′ + bqp1;x, z)p2.
36
Lz(bq, p, p2) is continuous over [0, q¯′ − d]×
[
κr
q¯′+κq ,
κr+r¯′
κq
]2
and, hence, is uniformly contin-
uous. Therefore, for any  > 0, there exists some δˆ() ≤  such that
|p1 − p′1| < δˆ() and |p2 − p′2| < δˆ()⇒ |Lz(bq, p1, p2)− Lz(bq, p′1, p′2)| < . (52)
Notice that ∂
∂bq
Hx(bq, 0; p
N) = Lz(bq, p
N , pN) and that
∂
∂bq
H˜λ
N
x (bq, 0) =
∑
z′∈Z
φ˜Nx [z
′]Eγ˜N
z′
[
Lz′
(
bq,
R˜N−
Q˜N− + bq
,
Q˜N− R˜
N
−
(Q˜N− + bq)2
)]
.
Hence, it is sufficient to show that pN is close to both
R˜N−
Q˜N−+bq
and
Q˜N− R˜
N
−
(Q˜N−+bq)2
as N becomes
large and as λN/MN converges uniformly.
Because
pN − R˜
N
−
Q˜N−
=
∑
y∈X µz(y)βˆ
N,A
r (y) + κr∑
y∈X µz(y)βˆ
N,A
q (y) + κq
−
∑
k=1,..,K
∑
y∈Yk
λN− (Yk)
MN
ρ˜N(y)βˆN,Ar (y) + κr∑
k=1,..,K
∑
y∈Yk
λN− (Yk)
MN
ρ˜N(y)βˆN,Aq (y) + κq
,
we have ∣∣∣∣∣pN − R˜N−Q˜N−
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2(q¯′ + κq)(r¯′ + κr)κ2q
K∑
k=1
∣∣∣∣µz∗(Yk)− λN− (Yk)MN ρ˜N(y)
∣∣∣∣ .
Moreover,∣∣∣∣∣ Q˜N− R˜N−(Q˜N− + bq)2 − R˜
N
−
Q˜N−
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ r¯′ + κrκq q¯
′(2κq +
q¯
MN
)
κ2qM
N
and
∣∣∣∣∣ R˜N−Q˜N− + bq − R˜
N
−
Q˜N−
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ r¯′ + κrκq q¯
′
κqMN
.
Hence, for any  > 0 there exist N˜() and δ˜() ≤  such that if N > N˜() and if∣∣∣ρ˜N(y)− µz(y)µz(Yk) ∣∣∣ < δ˜() and ∣∣∣λN (Yk)MN − µz(Yk)∣∣∣ < δ˜() for all k, then∣∣∣∣∣ Q˜N− R˜N−(Q˜N− + bq)2 − pN
∣∣∣∣∣ <  and
∣∣∣∣∣ R˜N−Q˜N− + bq − pN
∣∣∣∣∣ <  for all bq. (53)
Let B = 2max{1, uq(d, r;x, z′), ur(q, d;x, z′) : r ∈
[
0, r¯′ + 2q¯′ r¯
′+κr
κq
]
, q ∈ [0, q¯′], z′ ∈ Z}.
Then, for all z′ ∈ Z, |Lz′(bq, p, p2)| ≤ 12B for all (bq, p, p2) ∈ [0, q¯′− d]× [ κrq¯′+κq , κr+r¯
′
κq
]2. Let
δ′ = δˆ( 
10B
) (see (52)). Let
δ2() = min{δ1( 
10B
), δ1(δ˜(δ′))} and N2() = max{N1( 
10B
), N˜(δ2())},
where N˜ and δ˜ are given in (53) and δ1() = min{δ1a(), δ1b ()} andN1() = max{N1a (), N1b ()}
with δ1a(), δ
1
b (), N
1
a (), N
1
b () given in Claim 1.
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Suppose that N > N2() and that
∣∣∣λN (Yk)MN − µz∗(Yk)∣∣∣ < δ2() for all k. By Claim 1a,
because N > N2() ≥ N1(/10B) and for all k,
∣∣∣λN (Yk)MN − µz(Yk)∣∣∣ < δ2() ≤ δ1(/10B),
we have φ˜Nx [z] > 1− /10B.
Moreover, because N > N1(δ˜(δ′)) and because
∣∣∣λN (Yk)MN − µz(Yk)∣∣∣ < δ1(δ˜(δ′)) for all k,
it follows from Claim 1a that
γ˜Nz
[∣∣∣∣ρ˜N(y)− µz(y)µz(Yk)
∣∣∣∣ < δ˜(δ′)] > 1− δ˜(δ′) ≥ 1− 10B.
Now, by (53), it follows that if
∣∣∣ρ˜N(y)− µz(y)µz(Yk) ∣∣∣ < δ˜(δ′), if ∣∣∣λN (Yk)MN − µz(Yk)∣∣∣ < δ˜(δ′), and
if N > N˜(δ′), then
max
{∣∣∣∣∣pN − R˜N−Q˜N− + bq
∣∣∣∣∣ ,
∣∣∣∣∣pN − Q˜N− R˜N−(Q˜N− + bq)2
∣∣∣∣∣
}
< δ′ = δˆ(

10B
).
This and (52) imply∣∣∣∣∣Lz
(
bq,
R˜N−
Q˜N− + bq
,
Q˜N− R˜
N
−
(Q˜N− + bq)2
)
− Lz(bq, pN , pN)
∣∣∣∣∣ < 10B.
Therefore,
∣∣∣λN (Yk)MN − µz(Yk)∣∣∣ < δ˜(δ′) and N > N˜(δ′) imply that
γ˜Nz
[∣∣∣∣∣Lz
(
bq,
R˜N−
Q˜N− + bq
,
Q˜N− R˜
N
−
(Q˜N− + bq)2
)
− Lz(bq, pN , pN)
∣∣∣∣∣ < 10B
]
> 1− 
10B
.
Combining these results we have∣∣∣∣ ∂∂bqHx(bq, 0; pN)− ∂∂bq H˜λNx (bq, 0)
∣∣∣∣
≤ Eγ˜Nz
[
Lz
(
bq,
R˜N−
Q˜N− + bq
,
Q˜N− R˜
N
−
(Q˜N− + bq)2
)
− Lz(bq, pN , pN)
]
+ (1− φ˜Nx [z])B
< [

10
+

10B
(2B)] + [/10B]B < .
This establishes (51).
Now we complete the proof of Claim 3 for β˜N,A. Let Q(bq, br; p) = q¯′ − bq + brp . It is
straightforward to check that there exists a D1 > 0 such that
|bq − b′q|+ |br − b′r| < D1|Q(b; p)−Q(b′; p)| for all (b, b′, p) ∈ O2 ×
[
κr
q¯′ + κq
,
κr + r¯
′
κq
]
.
Also, letting
M(q; p) = uq(q, pq¯
′ + r¯′ − pq;x, z)− ur(q, pq¯′ + r¯′ − pq;x, z)p,
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we have
∂
∂bq
Hx(bq, 0; p
N) = −M(Q(bq, 0; pN); pN) and ∂
∂br
Hx(0, br; p
N) = M(Q(0, br; p
N); pN)/pN .
Now, let D2 satisfies
1/D2 = −max{uqq(q, r;x, z)− 2puqr(q, r;x, z) + p2urr(q, r;x, z) :
(q, r, p) ∈
[
d, q¯′ +
r¯′(q¯′ + κq)
κr
]
×
[
d, r¯′ +
q¯′(r¯′ + κr)
κq
]
×
[
κr
q¯′ + κq
,
κr + r¯
′
κq
]
},
where uqq, uqr, and urr denote second-order derivatives of u. Because u is strictly concave
and continuously twice differentiable, D2 is well-defined and D2 > 0. Moreover,
M ′(q; pN) = uqq(q, r;x, z)− 2pNuqr(q, r;x, z) + (pN)2urr(q, r;x, z)
with r = pN q¯′ + r¯′ − pNq. Hence, M ′(q; pN) < −1/D2 for all q = Q(b; pN) with (b, pN) ∈
O2 ×
[
κr
q¯′+κq ,
κr+r¯′
κq
]
.
Because the offer χ(x; pN) is a “price-taking” offer, it satisfies the first-order conditions
at equality, i.e., M(Q(χ(x; pN); pN); pN) = 0. Therefore, by the Mean Value Theorem, for
any  > 0, if |M(q¯ − bq + brpN ; pN)| < /D1D2 with bqbr = 0, then
|bq − χq(x; pN)|+ |br − χr(x; pN)| < . (54)
Let D = 2D1D2 r¯
′+κr
κq
. Then, for any pN ∈
[
κr
q¯′+κq ,
κr+r¯′
κq
]
, pND1D2 < D.
Now, let N3() = N2(/D) and δ3() = δ2(/D), where N2 and δ2 are given by (51).
Suppose that N > N2() and that
∣∣∣λN (Yk)MN − µz(Yk)∣∣∣ < δ2() for all k. We consider three
cases.
(a) β˜N,Aq (x) > 0.
Then, ∂
∂bq
H˜λ
N
x (β˜
N,A
q (x), 0) = 0. By (51), we have
∣∣∣ ∂∂bqHx(β˜N,Aq (x), 0; pN)∣∣∣ < /D and
hence |M(Q(β˜N,Aq (x), 0; pN); pN)| < /D. This, by (54), implies that
|β˜N,Aq (x)− χq(x; pN)|+ |χr(x; pN)| < .
(b) β˜N,Ar (x) > 0.
Then, ∂
∂br
H˜λ
N
x (0, β˜
N,A
r (x)) = 0. By (51), we have
∣∣∣ ∂∂brHx(0, β˜N,Ar (x); pN)∣∣∣ < /D and
hence |M(Q(β˜N,Aq (x), 0; pN))/pN | < /D. This, (54), and D/pN > D1D2 for all pN ∈[
κr
q¯+κq
, κr+r¯
κq
]
imply
|χq(x; pN)|+ |β˜N,Ar (x)− χr(x; pN)| < .
(c) β˜N,Aq (x) = 0 = β˜
N,A
r (x).
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Then, ∂
∂bq
H˜λ
N
x (0, 0) ≤ 0 and ∂∂br H˜λ
N
x (0, 0) ≤ 0. By (51), we have
−M(Q(0, 0; pN); pN) = ∂
∂bq
Hx(0, 0; p
N) <
∂
∂bq
Hλ
N
x (0, 0) + /D ≤ /D
and
M(Q(0, 0; pN); pN)/pN =
∂
∂br
Hx(0, 0; p
N) <
∂
∂br
Hλ
N
x (0, 0) + /D ≤ /D.
It then follows that |M(Q(0, 0; pN); pN)| < /D1D2 and hence
|χq(x; pN)|+ |χr(x; pN)| < .
This concludes the proof of Claim 3 for β˜N,A.
The argument is identical for βˆN,A, except that we need an additional argument to
show that for any  > 0, there exists N2() and δ2() such that if N > N2() and if∣∣∣λN (Yk)MN − µz(Yk)∣∣∣ < δ2() for all k, then for all bq ∈ [0, q¯′ − d] and all br ∈ [0, r¯′ − d],∣∣∣∣ ∂∂bqHx(bq, 0; pN)− ∂∂bq HˆλNx (bq, 0)
∣∣∣∣ <  and ∣∣∣∣ ∂∂brHx(0, br; pN)− ∂∂br HˆλNx (0, br)
∣∣∣∣ < .
(55)
Although (55) is completely analogous to (51), an additional argument is required because
β˜N,A appears in (QˆN− , Rˆ
N
− ), while p
N only involves βˆN,A.
Notice that
pN − Rˆ
N
−
QˆN−
=
∑
y∈X µz(y)βˆ
N,A
r (y) + κr∑
y∈X µz(y)βˆ
N,A
q (y) + κq
−
∑
k=1,..,K
∑
y∈Yk
λN− (Yk)
MN
ρˆN(y)βˆN,Ar (y) +
1
MN
β˜N,Ar (ξ˜) + κr∑
k=1,..,K
∑
y∈Yk
λN− (Yk)
MN
ρˆN(y)βˆN,Aq (y) + 1MN β˜
N,A
q (ξ˜) + κq
.
Therefore,∣∣∣∣∣pN − RˆN−QˆN−
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2(q¯′ + κq)(r¯′ + κr)κ2q
[
K∑
k=1
∣∣∣∣µz(Yk)− λN− (Yk)MN ρˆN(y)
∣∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣ q¯MN + r¯MN ∣∣∣
]
.
Also,∣∣∣∣∣ QˆN− RˆN−(QˆN− + bq)2 − Rˆ
N
−
QˆN−
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ r¯′ + κrκq q¯
′(2κq +
q¯′
MN
)
κ2qM
N
and
∣∣∣∣∣ RˆN−QˆN− + bq − Rˆ
N
−
QˆN−
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ r¯′ + κrκq q¯
′
κqMN
.
Thus, for any  > 0 there exist N˜() and δ˜() ≤  such that if N > N˜() and if∣∣∣ρˆN(y)− µz(y)µz(Yk) ∣∣∣ < δ˜() and ∣∣∣λN (Yk)MN − µz(Yk)∣∣∣ < δ˜(), then∣∣∣∣∣pN − RˆN−QˆN−
∣∣∣∣∣ < ,
∣∣∣∣∣ QˆN− RˆN−(QˆN− + bq)2 − pN
∣∣∣∣∣ < , and
∣∣∣∣∣ RˆN−QˆN− + bq − pN
∣∣∣∣∣ < 
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for all bq. Given these results, the rest of the argument is exactly the same as for β˜N,A.2
Claim 4. For any  > 0, there exists N4() such that if N > N4(), then for all x ∈ X,
|FNx (A)− FNx (sN2 (x))| <  for any A ⊆ X, (56)
where, recall, FNx (A) is the expected payoff from offer a that is associated with the set A
at stage-2 conditional on being active.
Proof. Consider a state z. First we show that for any  > 0, there exist N5() and δ5()
such that if N ≥ N5() and if ∣∣λN(Yk)/MN − µz(Yk)∣∣ < δ5(), then for each x ∈ X,
‖ βˆN,A(x)− βz,κ(x) ‖<  and ‖ β˜N,A(x)− βz,κ(x) ‖< , (57)
where ‖ b − b′ ‖= |bq − b′q| + |br − b′r| for all b, b′ ∈ O, and recall that βz,κ is the offer
corresponding to the CE in Lz(κ). We establish (57) for βˆN,A and a fixed state z∗. The
other case is exactly the same.
If we set
δ˜ = (δ˜q, δ˜r) =
∑
x∈X
µz∗(x)[β
N(x)− χ(x; pN)],
then, by construction, (χ(x; pN))x∈X satisfies
pN =
∑
x∈X µz∗(x)χr(x; p
N) + κr + δ˜r∑
x∈X µz∗(x)χq(x; p
N) + κq + δ˜q
.
That is, (χ(x; pN))x∈X is an offer corresponding to the unique CE in the limit economy
with µz∗(x) proportion of type-x agents, each with endowment (q′, r′), and with exogenous
supplies (κq + δ˜q, κr + δ˜r). Moreover, the CE is continuous in δ˜. Thus, there exists a
δP () ≤  such that if max{|δ˜q|, |δ˜r|} ≤ δP (), then
‖βz∗,κ(x)− χ(x; pN)‖ <  for all x ∈ X. (58)
Now for any  > 0, let δ′ = δP (/2) and let δ5() = δ3(δ′). Let N5() = N3(δ′). By Claim
3, if
∣∣∣λN (Yk)MN − µz(Yk)∣∣∣ < δ3(δ′) for all k and if N > N3(δ′), then
‖β˜N,A(x)− χ(x; pN)‖ < δ′ ≤ 
2
for all x ∈ X.
This then implies that
|δ˜q|+|δ˜r| ≤
∑
x∈X
µz∗(x)|β˜N,Aq (x)−χq(x; pN)|+
∑
x∈X
µz∗(x)|β˜N,Ar (x)−χr(x; pN)| < δ′ = δP (/2).
By (58), this implies that ‖βz,κ(x)− χ(x; p)‖ < /2. Thus, for each x,
‖β˜N,A(x)− βz∗,κ(x)‖ ≤ ‖β˜N,A(x)− χ(x; pN)‖+ ‖βz∗,κ(x)− χ(x; pN)‖ < ,
which is (57).
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Let γ¯Nz be the probability distribution over other active agents’ types conditional on
state z; that is, γ¯Nz [ξ1, ..., ξMN−1] =
∏MN
t=1 µz(ξt). For any nonempty A ⊆ X,
FNx (A) =
∑
z∈Z
τx[z]Eγ¯Nz
[
u
(
q¯′ +
β˜N,Ar (x)Q
N
− − β˜N,Aq (x)RN−
β˜N,Ar (x) +RN−
, r¯′ +
β˜N,Aq (x)R
N
− − β˜N,Ar (x)QN−
β˜N,Aq (x) +QN−
;x, z
)]
,
where
(QN− , R
N
− ) =
∑
y∈X
σ(y)βˆN,A(y) +MNκ and σ(y) = #{ξt : t = 1, ...,MN − 1, ξt = y}.
By the law of large numbers, σ(y)/MN converges to µz(y) in probability under γ¯Nz .
As a result, λN(Yk)/MN converges to µz(Yk) in probability under γ¯Nz . Therefore, by (57),
for any ′ > 0 there exists N z(′) such that if N > N z(′), then
γ¯Nz
[∣∣∣∣∣
(
β˜N,Ar (x)Q
N
− − β˜N,Aq (x)RN−
β˜N,Ar (x) +RN−
)
−
(
βz,κr (x)
pz,κ
− βz,κq (x)
)∣∣∣∣∣ < ′
]
> 1− ′
and
γ¯Nz
[∣∣∣∣∣
(
β˜N,Aq (x)R
N
− − β˜N,Ar (x)QN−
β˜N,Aq (x) +QN−
)
− (βz,κq (x)pz,κ − βz,κr (x))
∣∣∣∣∣ < ′
]
> 1− ′.
With appropriate ′’s, this implies that∣∣∣∣∣FNx (A)−∑
z∈Z
τx[z]u
(
q¯′ +
βz,κr (x)
pz,κ
− βz,κq (x), r¯′ + βz,κq (x)pz,κ − βz,κr (x);x, z
)∣∣∣∣∣ < .
Claim 4 follows from the fact that there are only finitely many nonempty A ⊆ X. 2
Now we complete the proof. Recall that we begin with a candidate semi-pooling
equilibrium associated with the partition Y = {Y1, ..., YK} with 1 < K < |X|. Because
such an equilibrium does not exist when |X| = 2, we may assume that for some y1, y2 ∈ X,
y1 6= y2 ∈ Y1. We use α(x, κ) to denote the stage-2 offer that corresponds to stage-2
consumption q̂(x, κ) for all x. Recall that Gx(a) is the objective function for a type-x agent
at stage-2 conditional on being inactive (see (30)). Because y1 6= y2, there exists C > 0
such that for any a ∈ O, either Gy1(a) < Gy1(α(y1, κ))−C or Gy2(a) < Gy2(α(y1, κ))−C.
Assume without loss of generality that Gy1(sN1 (Y1)) < Gy1(α(y
1, κ))−C so that sN2 (y1) 6=
α(y1, κ). Consider then a potential defector of type y1.
Let N¯ = N4( ηC
2(1−η)). Then, by Claim 4, if N ≥ N¯ ,
|FNy1 (sN2 (Y1))− FNy1 (α(y1, κ))| <
ηC
2(1− η) and |F
N
y2 (s
N
2 (Y1))− FNy2 (α(y2, κ))| <
ηC
2(1− η) .
Then, for N ≥ N¯ ,
ηGy1(s
N
1 (Y1)) + (1− η)FNy1 (sN2 (Y1))
< η(Gy1(α(y
1, κ))− C) + (1− η)(FNy1 (α(y1, κ)) +
ηC
2(1− η))
= ηGy1(α(y
1, κ)) + (1− η)FNy1 (α(y1, κ))−
ηC
2
.
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Hence, deviating from sN2 (y
1) to α(y1, κ) is profitable, a contradiction. This shows that
sN is a fully-revealing equilibrium.
Proposition 4. Assume U1-U5 and suppose that the competitive demand for good-q
is monotone in Lz for each z ∈ Z. Then, there exists N¯ such that for all N > N¯ , any
symmetric PBE in pure strategies sN = (sN1 , s
N
2 , s
N
3 ) is fully revealing.
Proof. Under U4, (sN2 , s
N
3 ) describes equilibrium behavior conditional on full partic-
ipation, and, by Proposition 3, we have the required uniqueness conditional on full-
participation for N large. It remains to establish that full-participation is the unique
stage-1 equilibrium.
An agent at stage-1 considers two alternatives. Either everyone else participates or
not. If not, then the agent is indifferent between {yes, no} because both leave the agent
with the endowment (q, r). If everyone else participates, then, according to U5, the agent
computes an expected payoff from participating from the unique continuation equilibrium
of Proposition 3. As shown in the final step of the proof of Proposition 1, for N large that
payoff exceeds the utility of the endowment (q, r), the payoff from playing no. Therefore,
playing no is a weakly dominated action in the sense of U5.
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